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Abstract
We consider a decision maker (DM) who, before taking an action, seeks infor-
mation by allocating her limited attention dynamically over different news sources
that are biased toward alternative actions. Endogenous choice of information gener-
ates rich dynamics: The chosen news source either reinforces or weakens the prior,
shaping subsequent attention choices, belief updating, and the final action. The
DM adopts a learning strategy biased toward the current belief when the belief is
extreme and against that belief when it is moderate. Applied to consumption of
news media, observed behavior exhibits an “echo-chamber” effect for partisan voters
and a novel “anti echo-chamber” effect for moderates.
Keywords: Wald sequential decision problem, choice of information, own-biased
and opposite-biased learning strategies, limited attention.
1 Introduction
Information is central to decision making. Individuals, firms, and government agencies
often expend significant resources to evaluate their choices in consumption, investment,
and public projects. This is particularly so in high-stakes deliberation; e.g., when a voter
deliberates on alternative candidates, when a researcher investigates a hypothesis, or when
a judge or a juror weighs a defendant’s guilt in a criminal case. In such situations and
others, decision makers have access to different “news” sources or diverse views on their
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actions. For instance, voters may expose themselves to like-minded news channels or to
opposite-minded ones. Jurors may hear adversarial lawyers advocating opposing views on
the case. Individuals also make attention choices in their internal processes of deliberation
and thinking. For instance, a researcher may expend efforts to either prove or disprove a
hypothesis.
In this paper, we ask how a decision maker (DM) should allocate her limited attention
across different news sources or different deliberation strategies dynamically over time,
and how that process shapes her choice of action. An important aspect of this problem is
how long the DM should search for information before stopping to take an action. This
stopping problem has been studied extensively by many authors, starting with Wald (1947)
and Arrow, Blackwell, and Girshick (1949). While sharing the premise that information
is costly and takes time to arrive, the contribution of the current paper is to study how a
DM allocates her attention over different types of news sources.
In our model the DM faces binary actions, r and `, which are optimal in states R
and L, respectively. The state is initially unknown, and the DM has a prior belief. At
each point in time, the DM may stop and take an action which is irreversible, or she may
acquire more information about the state. In the latter case, she incurs a flow cost and
payoffs are discounted.
Information can be received from of two sources: an L-biased or an R-biased news
source.1 The L-biased news source always sends an L-signal in state L and sometimes
also in state R. Otherwise, it sends an R-signal. Since the R-signal is sent only in state
R, it fully reveals the state. Symmetrically, the R-biased news source is biased toward
sending an R-signal, except that in state L it occasionally reveals the state to be L. At
each point in time, the DM has a unit budget of attention to allocate between these two
news sources, and she may “multi-home” by arbitrarily dividing her attention between the
two sources. In our continuous time model, these two news sources reduce to two Poisson
processes that each generate breakthrough news revealing one state. In the absence of a
breakthrough, each source leads to continuous updating of the belief in the direction of
the source’s bias. We show that these Poisson processes can be justified as optimal within
a class of experiments which encompass general non-conclusive Poisson signals.
The main trade-off in our model is the decision between news sources that are biased in
favor of, or against one’s current belief. We obtain a novel characterization of the optimal
learning/attention strategy. While our model allows for general strategies, we show that
for each prior belief, the DM optimally uses one of three simple heuristics: (i) immediate
action, (ii) own-biased learning, and (iii) opposite-biased learning ; and she never switches
between these different modes of learning.
1We assume that the DM is Bayesian, so that a news source cannot systematically bias her belief. The
term “bias” here refers to the frequency of a signal favoring one state, which will be clarified in detail
later.
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Immediate action is a simple strategy where the DM takes an optimal action given
her prior without acquiring any information. Own-biased learning focuses attention
on the news source that is biased toward the state that the DM finds relatively likely. An
example is to focus on the R-biased news source when state R is relatively likely. Given
this strategy, the DM will take action ` if breakthrough news reveals the state to be L.
Otherwise, and more likely, the DM becomes more convinced of state R, which leads to
further own-biased learning. Eventually, she becomes sufficiently certain that the state is
R—her belief reaches a stopping boundary, and she chooses action r without fully learning
the state. Opposite-biased learning focuses attention on the news source biased toward
the state she finds relatively unlikely. An example is to focus initially on the L-biased news
source when state R is relatively likely. When following this strategy, the DM becomes
less confident about state R when no breakthrough news arrives. Eventually, she becomes
so uncertain that she switches to a second phase where she divides her attention equally
between the R-biased and the L-biased news source. She continues to acquire information
and never stops until a breakthrough reveals the true state.
The optimality of the alternative learning strategies depends on the parameters as
well as the DM’s prior. In particular, the cost of information as measured by the flow
cost and discounting is important. Not surprisingly, if information is very costly, the DM
takes an immediate action for all beliefs. For moderate information acquisition costs, we
show that the DM optimally takes an immediate action when she is extremely certain,
while she employs own-biased learning when she is more uncertain. Finally, if information
acquisition costs are low, immediate action is again optimal for extreme priors, and own-
biased learning is optimal for less extreme priors. For very uncertain priors, however,
opposite-biased learning becomes optimal.
The intuition behind the optimal policy is explained by a trade-off between accuracy
and delay. With an extreme belief, a fairly accurate decision can be made even without
evidence, so further information acquisition is worth relatively little compared to the delay
it causes. Conversely, with a less extreme belief, information acquisition is more valuable.
This explains why the experimentation region contains moderate beliefs and the stopping
region is located at the extreme ends of the belief space. This trade-off also explains which
strategy is optimal inside the experimentation region. Opposite-biased learning will lead
to a fully accurate decision because the DM never takes an action before learning the state,
but this could take a long time. By contrast, own-biased learning is likely to produce a
quick decision, because when no breakthrough arrives, it takes only a finite period of
time for the DM to reach the stopping boundary and take an action. The price of a
quick decision is lower accuracy, since the DM sometimes takes an incorrect action when
she reaches the stopping region without breakthrough news. When the DM is already
quite certain, under own-biased learning the time needed to reach the stopping boundary
is very short, and the higher accuracy of opposite-biased learning is less valuable. This
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explains why the DM chooses own-biased learning when she is more certain and opposite-
biased learning only when she is more uncertain. An implication is that a “skeptic”
is more likely to make an accurate decision but with a longer delay than a “believer.”
This prediction—particularly the dependence of decision accuracy on the prior beliefs—
constitutes an important difference relative to the existing literature, as will be explained
in Section 4.3.
Our model yields rich implications in terms of dynamic feedback between the DM’s
selective exposure to a news source and her belief updating. This feedback is particularly
relevant for voters who consult media, say before an election. Our results imply that opti-
mal media choice leads to an “echo-chamber effect,” where voters with relatively extreme
beliefs subscribe to own-biased media that are likely to reinforce their prior beliefs. With
their beliefs reinforced, such voters further subscribe to own-biased news media, repeating
the same process until they become sufficiently convinced. The resulting feedback loop
results in polarization of beliefs. Interestingly, with sufficiently informative media, this
effect is reversed for voters with moderate beliefs. They optimally seek opposite-biased
outlets. As a result, they are likely to become more skeptical about their initial beliefs.
With growing skepticism, such voters will eventually multi-home both types of media
outlets until they receive conclusive news that leads them to make up their minds. Their
behavior thus exhibits an “anti-echo chamber effect.”
Relation to the Literature
Our model incorporates endogenous choice of information in an optimal stopping frame-
work a` la Wald (1947). Optimal stopping problems with exogenous information have been
analyzed in a Poisson framework (see Peskir and Shiryaev, 2006, ch. VI), but economic
applications have focused on drift-diffusion models (DDM) in which the signal follows a
Brownian motion with a drift determined by the state. Moscarini and Smith (2001) ex-
tend the stopping problem by allowing for an endogenous choice of signal precision. Other
applications of DDMs include Chan, Lizzeri, Suen, and Yariv (2018), Fudenberg, Strack,
and Strzalecki (2017), Henry and Ottaviani (2017), and McClellan (2017). An exception
is Nikandrova and Pancs (2018) who consider the problem of selectively learning about
different investment projects in a Poisson framework. In their model, the payoffs of final
actions are uncorrelated whereas our model assumes negatively correlated payoffs.2
Ultimately, whether a DDM or a Poisson model is appropriate depends on the specific
application at hand.3 From a theoretical point of view, Zhong (2017) justifies Poisson
2See also the recent paper by Mayskaya (2016), and Ke and Villas-Boas (2016), which is concurrent
to our paper.
3DDMs, which lead to a continuous belief process, are more suitable for the problem of learning the
properties of a data-generating process from a sequence of samples, as in clinical trials, or for the analysis
of statistical information. Poisson models, which lead to discontinuous updating, are useful to model
the discovery of individual pieces of information that are very informative, as is common in the political
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learning as an optimal information choice in a model that also allows for learning from a
diffusion process.4
Our model shares a common theme with the rational inattention model (henceforth,
RI) introduced by Sims (2003) and further developed by Matejka and McKay (2015) and
Steiner, Stewart, and Mateˇjka (2017). Like our paper, the RI models explain individual
choice as resulting from the optimal allocation of limited attention over diverse informa-
tion. However, our model differs from the RI models in two respects. One feature of
the RI model is that the same Blackwell experiment entails different costs for different
beliefs. We do not allow for such belief-dependence of the information technology. Thus
any dependence of information choice on beliefs arises from the DM’s incentives, rather
than the technology she faces. Second and more important, the RI model abstracts from
the precise dynamic process of allocating one’s attention. By contrast, our objective is to
unpack the “black box” and explicitly characterize the DM’s dynamic attention choice.
Steiner, Stewart, and Mateˇjka (2017) extend the RI model to a dynamic setting in which
a DM chooses a sequence of multiple actions. However, their main objective is to charac-
terize stochastic choice rather than the dynamic information acquisition, the main focus
of our paper. As they acknowledge, the information acquisition strategy implementing
the optimal stochastic choice is not uniquely pinned down (see p. 527 of Steiner, Stewart,
and Mateˇjka (2017)). Hebert and Woodford (2017) and Morris and Strack (2017) provide
a link between RI and DDM models by showing that a class of static reduced-form cost
functions, including RI, can be microfounded by dynamic DDM models.
Our model leads to rich predictions about the stochastic choice function that are
not obtained in the DDM or RI framework. In the latter two, the accuracy of the DM’s
decision is independent of the prior (conditional on information acquisition). In our model,
the accuracy varies with the prior.5 There are two reasons for this difference. First, the
endogenous choice of information sources leads to different modes of learning depending
on the prior, which results in significant differences in the accuracy and delay. Second, in
our Poisson model, the DM may reach a decision either following a breakthrough, or after
the belief drifts to a stopping bound. In the DDM framework, all decisions are reached
after drifting to a decision boundary.6 (See Section 4.3 for further discussion.)
sphere, in criminal investigations, or when a scientist searches for a breakthrough insight that will prove
or disprove a hypothesis.
4His model differs from ours in that it assumes a posterior separable cost function (see e.g. Caplin,
Dean, and Leahy, 2018). Much like the rational inattention model described below, the cost of a Blackwell
experiment depends on the DM’s belief in his model. By contrast, feasible experiments and their costs
do not depend on the DM’s belief in our model. Due to this difference, our models are not directly
comparable; his framework cannot be used to formulate our model (see also footnote 36 in Section 6.1).
5Note however, that this dichotomy is less clear in decision problems with a richer state-space such as
Fudenberg, Strack, and Strzalecki (2017) and Ke and Villas-Boas (2016). A complete comparison of the
implications of continuous versus discontinuous learning is beyond the current state of the literature.
6Note that we are comparing our model with discontinuous learning and endogenous information
choice to a DDM model with continuous learning and exogenous information. In our two-state model, it
is not possible to formulate a DDM with multiple information sources making it impossible to describe
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The Poisson signal structure was introduced in bandit problems by Keller, Rady, and
Cripps (2005). The negatively-correlated bandits model of Klein and Rady (2011) parallels
the choice between two biased Poisson processes studied in the current paper. However,
there are two fundamental differences. First, there is difference in timing. In our model,
exploiting a payoff requires the DM to stop learning, whereas in bandit problems, she can
exploit payoffs while learning. Second, in bandit models, information sources are linked
to exploitation of specific arms. For these reasons, a distinct characterization emerges;
for instance, there is no analogue to our “own-biased learning” in the bandit literature.7
Finally, the current paper is related to the media choice literature. It has been observed
before that a Bayesian voter may find it optimal to consume news from a biased outlet
(see Calvert (1985), Suen (2004), and Burke (2008)). In particular, Suen (2004) observes
self-perpetuation and polarization of beliefs. As we elaborate later, however, these models
consider very special cases that prevent nontrival dynamics from emerging.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents an
example to illustrate the main results. Section 4 characterizes the optimal policy. Section
5 applies the model to media choice. Section 6 extends the model in several directions.
Section 7 concludes. Proofs are defered to Appendix A and the Supplemental Material.
2 Model
States, Actions and Payoffs. A DM must choose from two actions, r or `, whose
payoffs depend on the unknown state ω ∈ {R,L}. The payoff of taking action x ∈ {r, `}
in state ω is denoted by uωx ∈ R. We label states and actions such that it is optimal to
match the state, and assume that the optimal action yields a positive payoff—that is,
uRr > max
{
0, uR`
}
and uL` > max
{
0, uLr
}
.8 The DM may delay her action and acquire
information. In this case, she incurs a flow cost of c ≥ 0 per unit of time. In addition,
her payoffs (and the flow cost) are discounted exponentially at rate ρ ≥ 0. Either c or ρ
may be zero, but not both.
The DM’s belief is denoted by the probability p ∈ [0, 1] that the state is R. Her
prior belief at time t = 0 is denoted by p0. If the DM chooses her action optimally
without information acquisition, then given belief p, she will realize an expected payoff
of U(p) := max{Ur(p), U`(p)}, where Ux(p) := puRx + (1 − p)uLx is the expected payoff of
taking action x. U(p) takes the piece-wise linear form depicted in Figure 4.2 on page 14.
separately the effect of discontinuous learning and endogenous information.
7This is also the case in Damiano, Li, and Suen (2017) who add additional learning to a Poisson bandit
model.
8Note that we allow for uRx = u
L
x so that one action x ∈ {r, `} can be a safe action. We rule out the
trivial case in which uωx ≥ uωy for x 6= y, in both states ω = R,L.
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Information Acquisition and Attention. We model information acquisition in con-
tinuous time. At each point in time, the DM may allocate one unit of attention across
an L-biased and an R-biased news source. The L-biased source sends Poisson break-
through news only in state R with an arrival rate of λ > 0, and the R-biased source
sends breakthrough news only in state L with an arrival rate of λ. Since, for a given
source, a breakthrough arrives only in one state, it conclusively reveals the true state. In
this sense, paying attention to the L-biased source say can be interpreted as “looking for
R-evidence.” Indeed, this interpretation describes some circumstances well and is hence
useful to keep in mind. For instance, one can interpret this as a judge or juror focusing
attention to evidence proving a certain state—guilt or innocence of a suspect, or a sci-
entist seeking firm evidence that either proves or disproves a certain hypothesis. For the
media choice application, however, interpreting news-sources according to their “biases”
is more useful.
To get a better understanding of this interpretation, it is useful to study the statistical
experiments induced by different attention choices. Suppose the DM pays full attention
to the L-biased news source for a short duration dt > 0. Then, she receives one of two
signals—breakthrough news (“signal σLR”), or its absence (“signal σ
L
L”). Panel (a) of
Figure 2.1 describes the probabilities of receiving these two signals in each state.
(a) L-biased experiment: σL
state/signal σLL σ
L
R
L 1 0
R 1− λdt λdt
(b) R-biased experiment: σR
state/signal σRL σ
R
R
L λdt 1− λdt
R 0 1
Figure 2.1: Experiments induced by two Poisson signals.
Experiment σL is “biased” toward L in the sense of sending the L-favoring signal σLL
excessively—always in state L but even in state R with some probability.9 An implication
of this is that σLL is a relatively weak signal that moves the belief toward L but not by much.
By contrast, the signal σLR—the R-favoring signal from source σ
L—reveals conclusively
that the state is R. Similarly, if the DM chooses the R-biased news source for a duration
dt > 0, then this induces the experiment σR depicted in Panel (b). This experiment
is biased toward R in the sense of sending the R-favoring signal excessively. While our
model focuses on conclusive Poisson experiments, we show in Section 6.1 that this focus
can be justified in a more general class of information technologies.
We assume that the DM may allocate any fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of her attention to L-
biased news and the remaining fraction β = 1 − α to R-biased news. In this case, she
receives R-evidence with arrival rate αλ in state R, and L-evidence with arrival rate βλ in
9As mentioned in Footnote 1, we use the term “bias” only in this sense. This terminology is in keeping
with the media choice literature as we will discuss in Section 6.1.
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state L. An interior attention choice can be interpreted as “multi-homing”—or switching
back and forth arbitrarily frequently—between the two news sources. We denote the DM’s
attention strategy by (αt) = (αt)t≥0, and assume that αt is a measurable function of t.
Suppose the DM uses the attention strategy (αt). In the absence of a breakthrough,
the DM’s belief will evolve according to Bayes rule:10
p˙t = −λ(αt − βt)pt(1− pt) = −λ(2αt − 1)pt(1− pt). (2.1)
The bias of a news source corresponds to the direction of updating in the absence of
breakthrough news. The higher α, the more L-biased is the mix of news sources that the
DM pays attention to. For instance, full attention to L-biased news (α = 1) makes the
DM pessimistic about state R if no breakthrough arrives. Consequently, her belief drifts
towards L. Finally, note that if the DM divides her attention equally between both news
sources, she never updates her belief in case of no breakthrough news: p˙t = 0 if αt = 1/2.
3 Illustrative Examples
Before proceeding, we use simple examples to illustrate the main insights of our results.
The examples will highlight the role of dynamics by considering one-period and two-
period versions of our model.11 For simplicity, assume the DM enjoys a payoff of 1 when
matching the state and −1 otherwise (uRr = uL` = 1, and uR` = uLr = −1). Time is discrete
with a period length of dt = 1, and the DM incurs a cost c per period if she acquires
information. There is no discounting. In each period, the DM can either stop and take
an irreversible action, or pay the cost c to observe one of the experiments σL and σR in
Figure 2.1.
One-Period Problem. Suppose the DM can experiment only once before taking an
action. For a prior p0 sufficiently high or low, the DM will optimally choose to take an
action immediately, since experimentation is costly. For less extreme priors p0, she will
experiment. The question is which news source she will pay attention to. We argue that
it is optimal to pick the “own-biased news source”—namely the experiment biased toward
one’s prior: σR if p0 > 1/2 and σ
L if p0 < 1/2.
The reason is that own-biased news lowers the chance of mistakes compared to opposite-
biased news. Specifically, suppose p0 > 1/2, so that the prior indicates that action r is
optimal, and assume that the DM picks the opposite-biased experiment, σL. There are
10Since the belief is a martingale, we have λαtptdt + (1− λαtptdt− λβt (1− pt) dt) [pt + p˙tdt] = pt.
Dividing by dt and letting dt→ 0 yields (2.1).
11These examples are similar in spirit to Suen (2004) and Burke (2008), except that information is
not costly in these models, which leads to a different characterization. In particular, dynamics has no
significant effect in these models, in contrast to the point made here.
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0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
DM's belief p
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
U(p)
V1(p)
V2(p)α(p)
L-biased L-biased
R-biased R-biased
Figure 3.1: Optimal policy in two-period learning
Note: λ = .85, c = .125; U(p) is the payoff from immediate action, V1(p) is the optimal payoff in the
one-period problem, V2(p) is the optimal payoff in the two-period problem, and α(p) is the choice of
experiment in the first (of two) periods, α = 1 corresponds to σL and α = 0 corresponds to σR.
two cases. Suppose first p0 is very high. Then even when the DM receives the L-favoring
signal σLL, this will not move her belief enough to “change” her action to `, meaning she
will choose r regardless of the signal. Hence, σL is worthless to her. By contrast, a DM
choosing σR will be “convinced” by an L-signal to change her action to `, which makes
σR valuable.
Next suppose that p0 > 1/2 but lower, so that an L-signal from σ
L also leads the
DM to choose `. Why is σL still inferior to σR? The reason is that σL chooses ` as the
“default action” which is taken unless conclusive R-evidence is observed. Since the prior
p0 > 1/2 favors state R, action r is a better default; so the own-biased experiment σ
R is
better because it leads to action r unless conclusive L-evidence is observed.12
Two-Period Problem. Now suppose the DM can experiment for up to two periods.
After observing the first signal, the DM may stop and take an action, or experiment
for another period. The problem facing the DM in the second period is precisely the
one-period problem above: Depending on her posterior belief after the first experiment,
she will either take an immediate action, or choose an own-biased experiment. But what
should she do in the first period?
12 To see precisely why σR is more valuable than σL if p0 > 1/2, we consider a (hypothetical) experiment
S with three possible signals SL, S0, and SR:
state/signal SL S0 SR
L λ 1− λ 0
R 0 1− λ λ
Clearly, S is Blackwell more informative than σL and σR, respectively. σL can be obtained from S by
observing only the partition {{SL, S0} , {SR}}, and σR can be obtained by observing only the partition
{{SL} , {S0, SR}}. What is the optimal decision rule following experiment S? If p0 > 1/2, the DM
should choose action r if she observes a signal in {S0, SR} and ` only if she observes SL. Action r is the
“default” chosen after the uninformative signal S0. This corresponds to the decision implemented by the
partition corresponding to σR. By contrast the partition corresponding to σL leads to action ` as the
“wrong default,” which reduces the value of this experiment compared to the value of σR (or of S).
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Figure 3.1 illustrates a case where the optimal choice of experiment in the first period
differs from that of the one-period problem. For extreme values of p0, an immediate
action is optimal as before. For less extreme priors (p0 ∈ [.07, .93]), the DM chooses to
experiment. When the belief is close to the boundaries of the experimentation region (p0 ∈
[.07, .27] or p0 ∈ [.73, .93]), the DM chooses own-biased news in period one. Afterwards,
she immediately takes an action without any further experimentation. The intuition is
that when her belief is already quite extreme, the marginal value of increasing the accuracy
for the decision is small, so she experiments only once. Conditional on experimenting once,
she prefers own-biased news for the same reason as in the one-period problem.
If the belief is moderate (p0 ∈ [.27, .73]), the DM picks an opposite-biased news source.
For instance, for p0 = .7, she chooses σ
L. Recall that this was not a good strategy in
the one-period problem since an action had to be taken even after a “weak” L-signal.
In the two-period problem, however, the DM can continue to experiment. This option
value can make both opposite-biased and own-biased learning more attractive. However,
for own-biased learning, the posterior after the first experiment becomes more extreme,
which limits the option value so that it is optimal to stop after period one.13 By contrast,
opposite-biased learning leads to a second round of experimentation, so the option value
is more significant in particular for moderate beliefs where the value of accuracy is high.
This explains the optimality of the opposite-biased learning with longer delay for the
moderate beliefs.
These examples suggest that dynamics matters for the optimal allocation of attention.
Different learning strategies are optimal for different beliefs, and a learning strategy that
is not myopically optimal becomes optimal when a DM can experiment for more than one
period. The pattern of the optimal strategy as well as the insights illustrated in these
examples generalize to our continuous time model, which we now turn to.
4 Analysis of the Optimal Strategy
We now analyze the DM’s optimal strategy in the continuous time model introduced in
Section 2.
4.1 Formulation of the Problem
The DM chooses an attention strategy (αt) = (αt)t≥0, and a stopping time T ∈ [0,∞] at
which a decision will be made if no breakthrough news is received by then.14 Her problem
13It is in fact optimal to stop after period one for p0 > .65. We focus on this range of beliefs because
it illustrates the difference between a static and a dynamic model most clearly.
14Given the linearity of the arrival rates in α, the DM cannot benefit from randomization in the
continuous time model. For this reason, we only consider deterministic strategies (αt)t∈R+ . Moreover, it
suffices to consider strategies that specify α as a function of t since the attention choice at time t is only
relevant if the DM has not received any conclusive signals until time t.
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is thus given by
V ∗(p0) = max
(αt),T
∫ T
0
e−ρtPt
[
ptλαtu
R
r + (1− pt)λβtuL` − c
]
dt+ e−ρTPT U(pT ), (4.1)
where pt satisfies (2.1), βt = 1 − αt, and Pt = p0e−λ
∫ t
0 αsds + (1 − p0)e−λ
∫ t
0 βsds is the
probability that no signal is received by time t given strategy (ατ ). The integrand in
the objective function captures the payoffs from taking an action following discovery
of evidence, and the flow cost incurred until the DM stops. Specifically, at each time t,
conditional on no discovery so far (which occurs with probability Pt), the strategy αt leads
to discovery of R-evidence with probability ptλαt, and of L-evidence with probability
(1 − pt)λβt, per unit time. The second term accounts for the payoff from the optimal
decision in case of no discovery by T .15
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for this problem is
c+ ρV (p) = max
α∈[0,1]
{
λαp
(
uRr − V (p)
)
+ λ(1− α)(1− p) (uL` − V (p))
−λ(2α− 1)p(1− p)V ′(p)
}
, (4.2)
if V (p) > U(p). If V (p) = U(p), the LHS of (4.2) should be no less than the RHS—in
this case T (p) = 0 and immediate action is optimal. The objective in (4.2) is linear in
α, which implies that the optimal policy is a bang-bang solution α∗(p) ∈ {0, 1}, except
when the derivative of the objective vanishes. While this observation narrows down our
search, there is a large class of strategies consistent with bang-bang choices. Ultimately,
one needs to characterize the attention choice for each belief, which we now turn to.
4.2 Learning Heuristics
We begin with several intuitive learning heuristics that the DM could employ. These
heuristics form basic building blocks for the DM’s optimal strategy. Specifically, it will
be seen that for each prior, the optimal strategy employs the heuristic with the highest
value and never switches even after the belief has moved away from the prior. The details
of the formal construction are presented in Appendix A.
Immediate action (without learning). A simple strategy is to take an immediate
action and realize U(p) without any information acquisition. Since information acquisition
is costly, this can be optimal if the DM is sufficiently confident in her belief—that is, if p
is either sufficiently high or sufficiently low.
15 For a given (αt)t∈R+ , conditional on no discovery, the posterior belief evolves according to a deter-
ministic rule (2.1). Since stopping matters only when there is no discovery, it is without loss to focus on
a deterministic stopping time T .
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Own-Biased Learning. When the DM decides to experiment, one natural strategy is
to focus attention on the news source that is biased toward the more likely state. Formally,
own-biased learning prescribes
α(p) =
1 if p ∈
(
p∗, pˇ
)
,
0 if p ∈ [pˇ, p∗) ,
(4.3)
for some reference belief pˇ and boundaries of the experimentation region
(
p∗, p∗
)
, which
will each be chosen optimally.16 For instance, if L is relatively likely, the DM chooses the
L-biased news source, or equivalently looks for conclusive R-evidence. In the absence of
such “contradictory” evidence, the DM’s belief drifts toward L. The belief updating is
illustrated by the direction of the arrows in Panel (a) of Figure 4.1. Eventually, the DM’s
belief will reach one of the boundary points p∗ or p∗, at which she is sufficiently certain
to take an immediate action without conclusive evidence. Since contradictory evidence is
unlikely, the DM adopting this strategy can be seen as seeking to gradually rule out the
unlikely state. For example, a juror or a judge sympathetic to a defendant’s innocence
may try to rule out incriminating evidence by actively looking for it, or a mathematician
convinced of her proof may try to rule out “errors” by actively searching for them.
Opposite-Biased Learning. Alternatively, the DM could focus attention on a news
source biased toward the state she finds relatively unlikely. Formally, opposite-biased
learning prescribes:
α(p) =

0 if p < p∗,
1
2
if p = p∗,
1 if p > p∗,
(4.4)
for some reference belief p∗ ∈ (0, 1), which will be chosen optimally.17 At the optimal
p∗, the DM is indifferent between all α ∈ [0, 1], so that the bang-bang result from the
previous section does not apply. For beliefs below p∗, the DM subscribes to the R-biased
news source, or equivalently, she seeks “confirmatory” evidence supporting the likely state
L. An example of such a strategy could be that a mathematician tries to prove a promising
hypothesis and to disprove unpromising one. In the absence of such affirmative proof, the
DM becomes more uncertain in her belief, which thus drifts inward. The belief updating
is illustrated in Panel (b) of Figure 4.1, with arrows indicating the direction of Bayesian
updating. As is clear from equation (2.1) and (4.4), her belief drifts from both extremes
towards the absorbing point p∗. Once p∗ is reached, the DM divides her attention equally
16When payoffs are symmetric between ` and r, then pˇ equals 1/2. In general, pˇ may not equal 1/2.
17In our notation, an asterisk (∗) indicates an absorbing point, as in p∗, p∗, p∗. Cutoff beliefs without
an asterisk indicate points were the belief diverges (e.g. pˇ, p, p). An overline (underline) is used to denote
cutoff beliefs to the right (left).
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(c) combination of own-biased and opposite-biased strategies
Figure 4.1: Structure of Heuristic Strategies and Optimal Solution.
between both news sources. In this case, no further updating occurs, and she repeats the
same strategy until she obtains evidence that reveals the true state.
4.3 Optimal Strategy
The structure of the optimal policy depends on the cost of information c. Intuitively,
the higher the flow cost, the lower the net value of experimenting. As will be seen,
the experimentation region expands as the cost of information falls. More interestingly,
the type of learning strategy employed also changes in a nontrivial way. The following
theorem shows that there are three cases. If c is very high, immediate action is always
optimal (case (a)). For intermediate values of c, the optimal strategy involves only own-
biased learning (case (b)). For low values of c, both own-biased and opposite-biased
learning occur (case (c)). For the theorem, we denote the optimal immediate action by
x∗(p) ∈ arg maxx∈{r,`} Ux(p), which is unique almost everywhere.
Theorem 1. For given utilities uωx , λ > 0, and ρ ≥ 0, there exist c = c(ρ, uωx , λ) and
c = c(ρ, uωx , λ), c ≥ c ≥ 0, with strict inequalities for ρ sufficiently small, such that the
unique optimal strategy is characterized as follows:18
(a) (No learning) If c ≥ c, the DM takes action x∗(p) without any information acqui-
sition.
(b) (Own-biased learning) If c ∈ [c, c), there exist cutoffs 0 < p∗ < pˇ < p∗ < 1 such
that for p ∈ (p∗, p∗), the optimal policy α∗(p) is given by (4.3). If p 6∈ (p∗, p∗), the
DM takes action x∗(p) without any information acquisition.
(c) (Own-biased and Opposite-biased learning) If c < c, then there exist cutoffs
0 < p∗ < p < p∗ < p < p∗ < 1 such that for p ∈ (p∗, p∗), the optimal policy is given
18The strategy is unique up to tie breaking at the beliefs p∗, p∗, p, p, pˇ. See (A.17) and (A.18) in
Appendix A for explicit expressions for c and c. See (A.9) and (A.10) for p∗ and p∗, and (A.13) for p∗.
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by
α∗(p) =

1, if p ∈ (p∗, p) ,
0, if p ∈ [p, p∗) ,
1
2
if p = p∗,
1, if p ∈ (p∗, p] ,
0, if p ∈ (p, p∗) .
(4.5)
If p 6∈ (p∗, p∗) the DM takes action x∗(p) without any information acquisition.
In cases (b) and (c), there are levels of confidence, given by p∗ and p∗, that the DM
finds sufficient for making decisions without any evidence. These beliefs constitute the
boundaries of the experimentation region; namely, an immediate action is chosen outside
these boundaries.
The optimal policy in case (b) is depicted in Panel (a) of Figure 4.1 on page 13 above.
In case (c) the pattern is more complex (see Panel (c) of Figure 4.1). Both own-biased
and opposite-biased learning are optimal for some beliefs. Theorem 1 shows that the
opposite-biased region (p, p) is always sandwiched between two regions where the own-
biased learning strategy is employed. That is, near the boundaries of the experimentation
region, the own-biased strategy is always optimal. Figure 4.2 shows the value of opposite-
biased learning (Vopp(p)) and own-biased learning (Vown(p)) for high and low costs. It
illustrates that the optimal policy picks the learning heuristic with the higher value.
The intuition behind the optimal strategy can be explained by a trade-off between
speed and accuracy. The opposite-biased strategy leads to complete learning: The DM
takes an action only if she receives conclusive evidence from breakthrough news. There-
fore, she never makes a mistake. By contrast, own-biased learning may lead to mistakes
if the DM’s belief drifts to the stopping boundary (p∗ or p∗) before observing a break-
through. In this case the DM stops without learning completely and may choose the
wrong action. Therefore, opposite-biased learning has an accuracy advantage. At the
L-biased
R-biased
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
R-biased
L-biased
R-biased
L-biased
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
U(p)
Vown(p)
Vopp(p)α*(p)
. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
)
Figure 4.2: Value Function and Optimal Policy.
Note: The value function is the upper envelope of Vown and Vopp (solid). (λ = 1, ρ = 0, u
R
r = 1, u
L
` = .9,
uR` = u
L
r = −.9)
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same time, full learning under the opposite-biased strategy leads to a potentially long
delay, because the DM has to wait for a breakthrough to arrive. By contrast, the delay
in the own-biased strategy is limited by the time it takes the belief to reach the stopping
boundary. Therefore own-biased learning has a speed advantage. This explains why the
DM never uses the opposite-biased learning except when the cost of learning is sufficiently
low, which makes the speed advantage less important.
The speed-accuracy tradeoff in the choice between the two strategies also explains
why own-biased learning is always optimal near the stopping boundaries. Here, the speed
advantage of own-biased learning is particularly large because it takes only a short period
of time for the belief to reach the stopping boundary. At the same time, for beliefs
near the stopping boundary, there is little uncertainty so that the value of full accuracy
is relatively small. The DM therefore prefers speed over accuracy. For more uncertain
beliefs, the value of learning the state is higher, making accuracy more important. At
the same time, the speed advantage of own-biased learning is smaller because it takes
longer for the belief to reach the stopping boundary. Therefore, the DM prefers the more
accurate opposite-biased strategy for more uncertain beliefs.
Speed and Accuracy of Decisions under the Optimal Strategy. We have already
noted intuitively that the speed and accuracy of the DM’s decision depends on the mode
of learning and her prior belief. Now we make some formal observations about the optimal
strategy in line with this intuition.
Proposition 1 (Speed and Accuracy). Suppose that c < c.
(a) The average delay in the DM’s decision is quasi-concave in the prior belief. If c ≥ c,
the delay is maximal at p0 = pˇ. If c < c, the delay is maximal at some p inside the
opposite-biased learning region.
(b) The probability of a mistake is quasi-convex; it is zero when the initial belief is in the
opposite-biased region. Within the own-biased region, the probability of a mistake is
positive and increasing as p gets closer to a stopping boundary.
This proposition shows that initial beliefs matter greatly for the accuracy of a decision
and its timing. A “skeptic”—a DM with uncertain initial belief—reaches a fully accurate
decision but at the expense of a long delay. By contrast, a “believer”—a DM with a more
extreme belief—sacrifices accuracy in favor of speed.19 This feature stands in contrast
to rational inattention and drift-diffusion models with non-shifting stopping boundaries.
These latter models predict that the accuracy of a chosen action is invariant to the DM’s
initial beliefs, as long as they are within the experimentation region.20
19Around the boundary beliefs p and p, the outcome in terms of accuracy and speed varies discontin-
uously, although the value is continuous.
20In a rational inattention model, an optimal experiment for a DM involves no more signals than the
number of actions chosen; otherwise, she can lower her information cost by eliminating the “wasteful”
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4.4 Comparative Statics
It is instructive to study how the optimal strategy varies with the parameters. We start
by considering the experimentation region.
Proposition 2 (Comparative Statics: Boundaries of the Experimentation Region).
(a) The experimentation region expands as ρ or c falls, and covers (0, 1) in the limit as
(ρ, c)→ (0, 0).21
(b) The experimentation region expands as uLr or u
R
` falls (so that “mistakes” become
more costly), and covers (0, 1) in the limit as (uLr , u
R
` )→ (−∞,−∞).22
(c) If c < c, then the experimentation region shifts down as uRr increases and up as u
L
`
increases.
Parts (a) and (b) are quite intuitive. The DM acquires information for a wider range
of beliefs if the cost of learning (ρ, c) falls, or if mistakes become more costly in the sense
that (uLr , u
R
` ) falls. The intuition for (c) is twofold: an increase in u
R
r increases the value
of a conclusive R-signal and thus causes p∗ to fall. Further, if ρ > 0, the immediate action
r becomes more attractive, which causes p∗ to shift down.
Next we consider how the payoffs from mistakes affect the cutoff beliefs that separate
regions in which the DM employs different modes of learning.
Proposition 3 (Comparative Statics: Mode of Learning).
(a) If c < c < c, then the cutoff pˇ in own-biased learning decreases if uR` falls, and
increases if uLr falls.
(b) For given c, the opposite-biased region appears (c > c) for (uLr , u
R
` ) sufficiently small,
and expands as (uLr , u
R
` ) falls. Given c > c, p converges monotonically to zero as
uR` → −∞, and p converges monotonically to one as uLr → −∞.
To get an intuition for Part (a), suppose p < pˇ. In this case, own-biased learning may
lead to taking action ` in the wrong state (state R). This mistake becomes more costly
as uR` becomes smaller and pˇ shifts down to avoid this mistake. In other words, the DM
avoids the L-biased source when action ` becomes more risky.
Part (b) shows that the cost of mistakes also matters for the relative appeal of the
alternative learning strategies: opposite-biased learning becomes more appealing when
signals (see Matejka and McKay (2015)). This property means any action chosen after performing an
experiment must correspond to a unique posterior, and hence a unique level of accuracy. In drift-diffusion
models, the drift-to-boundary structure of the optimal policy means that the accuracy of each decision
is pinned down by a corresponding stopping boundary. In many such models, the stopping boundaries
do not change over time, so the accuracy of each action is fixed. See Ratcliff and McKoon (2008) for a
survey.
21We say a region expands when a parameter change leads to a superset of the original region. This
includes the case that the region appears when it was empty before. We say a region shifts up (down)
when both boundaries of the region increase (decrease).
22For given c, if uR` and u
L
r are sufficiently small, c > c so that the experimentation region is non-empty.
Given c > c, p∗ converges monotonically to zero as uR` → −∞, and p∗ converges monotonically to one as
uLr → −∞.
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mistakes become more costly. In the limit where mistakes become completely unaccept-
able, the opposite-biased strategy becomes optimal for all beliefs. One could imagine this
limit behavior as that of a scientist who views conclusive evidence of either kind—proving
or disproving a hypothesis—as the only acceptable way of advancing science. Such a
scientist will rely solely on opposite-biased learning: she will initially strive to prove the
hypothesis she conjectures to be true; after a series of unsuccessful attempts to prove
the hypothesis, however, she begins to doubt her initial conjecture, and when the doubt
reaches a “boiling point” (i.e., p∗), she begins to put some effort to disproving it as well.23
Finally we show how the effect of a higher discount rate compares to the effect of a
higher flow cost. Intuitively, one would interpret ρ as a cost of learning and would thus
expect that c and ρ are substitutes in the sense that a higher discount rate requires a
lower flow cost for the same structure to emerge. Formally, one would expect ∂c/∂ρ < 0
and ∂c/∂ρ < 0. The following proposition shows that this is indeed the case if at least
one “mistake payoff” (uR` or u
L
r ) is not too small.
Proposition 4 (Discounting vs. Flow Cost).
(a) Suppose c > 0. Then ∂c/∂ρ < 0 if and only if U(p) > 0 for all p ∈ [0, 1].
(b) Suppose c > 0. Then ∂c/∂ρ < 0 if both uRr >
∣∣uR` ∣∣ and uL` > ∣∣uLr ∣∣; ∂c/∂ρ > 0 if
min
{
uR` , u
L
r
}
is sufficiently small.
If the mistake payoffs uR` and u
L
r are both negative and sufficiently large in absolute
value, both ∂c/∂ρ and ∂c/∂ρ are positive. Namely, a higher discount rate calls for more
experimentation in this case. This is intuitive since if losses are sufficiently large, the DM
would prefer to delay their realization, when they are discounted more. This favors longer
experimentation.
5 Application: Media Consumption
Media outlets differ in their partisan biases.24 There is evidence that the consumption
of biased news outlets affects the political leaning of voters and may change their voting
decisions (see DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) and Martin and Yurukoglu (2017) among
others). While a significant fraction of people multi-home and have a news diet that
contains outlets with different biases, consumers tend to consume news from outlets with
a partisan bias similar to their own position (see for example Gentzkow and Shapiro
23Own-biased learning could also describe some aspect of scientific inquiry if a scientist is willing to
accept a small margin of error. For instance, even a careful theorist may not verify thoroughly her “proof”
if she believes it to be correct. Rather, she may look for a mistake in her argument, and without finding
one may declare it a correct proof.
24One method to measure the partisan bias of an outlet is to compare the language used by the outlet
to the language used by members of congress whose partisanship is identified by their voting decisions.
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) pioneered this method for daily newspapers; Martin and Yurukoglu (2017)
use it to identify the bias of cable news channels.
17
(2011)). This partisan (or own-biased) selective exposure can lead to an “echo-chamber”
effect—partisan voters become increasingly polarized (see Martin and Yurukoglu (2017)).
Our model contributes to the literature on media choice by providing theoretical pre-
dictions about the optimal news diets for voters with different subjective beliefs, their
dynamic evolutions, and the implications for polarization.25
We interpret our DM as a citizen who votes for one of two candidates, r or `, possibly
after consulting media outlets.26 Candidate r has a right-wing platform, and candidate
` has a left-wing platform. The state ω ∈ {R,L} indicates the optimal platform for the
voter, uωx representing the voter’s utility from voting for x in state ω. The voter incurs
flow cost c > 0 for paying attention to the media.27 Her belief about the state is captured
by p. We say the voter is more right-leaning the higher p is.28
Naturally, we interpret the L-biased source as a left-wing outlet and the R-biased
source as a right-wing outlet. For example, a right-wing outlet publishes information that
supports the left-wing candidate only if it passes a high standard of accuracy—that is, if
it constitutes conclusive evidence.29 Of course this occurs rarely. Most of the time, the
outlet instead reports R-favoring content, which Bayesian consumers perceive as having
weak informational content. In the same vein, we interpret an interior “attention” choice
α ∈ (0, 1) as multi-homing by the voter across the two outlets, where α represents the
share of time she spends on the left-wing outlet.
Our interpretation of media bias accords well with the media literature (see Gentzkow,
Shapiro, and Stone (2015) for a survey). A common model in this literature views media
bias as arising from the manner in which an outlet “filters” raw news signals for its viewers.
25Our rational Bayesian framework to study media choice shares a theme with Calvert (1985), Suen
(2004), Burke (2008), Oliveros (2015), and Yoon (2016)—particularly the optimality of consuming a
biased medium for a Bayesian agent. These papers are largely static, unlike the current model which is
fully dynamic. Meyer (1991) makes a similar observation in a dynamic contest environment. Mullainathan
and Shleifer (2005) assume a “behavioral” bias on the part of consumers to predict media slanting.
26An alternative interpretation is that the citizen has no decision to make but derives a non-instrumental
payoff from reaching a certain opinion. The citizen subscribes to media and consults these on an issue
of interest. After some time, she may “make up her mind” on the issue and stop acquiring further
information. When making up her mind, she enjoys a payoff that increases in the precision of her belief,
for instance max {pt, 1− pt}. This interpretation corresponds to our model with uRr = uL` = 1 and
uR` = u
L
r = 0.
27Since the time at which the payoff is realized (the election or implementation of a policy) is inde-
pendent of when the voter makes up her mind, we assume ρ = 0. Our model does not capture the effect
of a “deadline,” which is clearly relevant for the election example. However, in line with the two-period
example discussed in Section 3, we conjecture that the salient features of our characterization which are
discussed in the context of this application carry over to a model with a sufficiently long deadline. See
Section 6 for further discussion of the effect of a deadline.
28Alternatively one could model a voter’s bias in terms of her payoffs. In this case uωx could incorporate
her “partisan” preference.
29The feature that a right-wing outlet could, albeit rarely, broadcast left-favoring news may appear
unusual but is a consequence of our voter being a Bayesian who cannot be systematically misled. This
feature is also consistent with empirical evidence. Chiang and Knight (2011) find that endorsements of
presidential candidates by newspapers are only influential if they go against the bias of the newspaper,
suggesting that consumers are, to some extent, able to correct for the bias of newspapers, as predicted
by the Bayesian model.
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Section 6.1 discusses how our information structure can be microfounded by such a model.
Given this interpretation, our theory, more specifically Theorem 1, provides a rich
portrayal of voters’ dynamic media choices and their effects. Voters with extreme beliefs
p /∈ (p∗, p∗) always vote for their favorite candidates without consulting media. Those
who consume media exhibit the following behavior:
• If news media are moderately informative so that the cost of information satisfies c ≤
c < c, right-leaning voters with p > pˇ subscribe to right-wing outlets and left-leaning
voters subscribe to left-wing outlets. Over time, in the absence of breakthrough news
that goes against their initial beliefs, all voters stick to their initial media choice.
• If media are highly informative, so that the cost of information is low (c < c),
moderately left-wing (p ∈ (p, p∗)) or moderately right-wing voters (p ∈ (p∗, p))
consume media that are biased against their beliefs, whereas partisan voters with
more extreme beliefs consume media that are biased in favor of their beliefs. Over
time, absent breakthrough news in favor of their initial beliefs, moderate voters (p ∈(
p, p
)
) become increasingly undecided and when their beliefs reach p∗, they multi-
home and divide their attention between both types of outlets; whereas partisan
voters become more extreme and continue to subscribe to own-based media.
The choice of opposite-biased media by moderate voters may seem counterintuitive.
Consider for example a moderate right-wing voter. This voter initially tries to find right-
favoring evidence which she expects more likely to arise given their belief. Interestingly,
she expects to find such evidence in left-wing outlets as they scrutinize right-favoring
information more and apply a very high standard for reporting such information.
In order to understand how consumers’ media choices interact with their beliefs, it
is useful to perform a simple thought experiment. Suppose there is a unit mass of con-
sumers with identical costs of information acquisition c; whose payoffs uωx are identical
and symmetric (so that pˆ = 1/2); and whose prior beliefs p0 are distributed according to
some distribution function F which is symmetric around 1/2 (i.e., F (p) = 1− F (1− p)).
Now, fix the state, say ω = L, and study how the distribution of consumers’ beliefs change
over time due to their media choice. Of particular interest is the extent to which theirs
beliefs become more or less polarized over time. While one can use a number of different
measures of polarization,30 we simply focus on the difference between the median belief
for consumers with p ≥ 1/2 and the median belief for consumers with p ≤ 1/2.
Proposition 5. Fix the true state to be ω = L and assume symmetric payoffs uL` = u
R
r
and uR` = u
L
r .
31
(a) The beliefs in the subpopulation of voters consuming own-biased outlets at time t = 0
become more polarized over time and converge to a distribution containing three mass
points, {0, p∗, p∗}.
30See Esteban and Ray (2012) for a survey of polarization measures.
31Symmetric results hold if the true state is ω = R.
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(b) If c ∈ (c, c), the beliefs of all voters become more polarized over time.
(c) The beliefs of the voters consuming opposite-biased outlets at time t = 0 converge to
the true state in the limit as t→∞.
Figure 5.1 shows snapshots of the evolution of beliefs taken at three different times,
assuming that initial distribution F is uniform on [0, 1]. The colors represent the media
choice by voters who are still subscribing to media.
t=0.
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Figure 5.1: Evolution of media choice and beliefs when the true state is L.
Note: Shaded areas represent the density of beliefs (left axis). Colors indicate the choice of media with
red indicating right-wing/conservative and blue indicating left-wing/liberal. Bold bars represent mass
points of beliefs (right axis).
The figure shows that those with extreme beliefs consume own-biased outlets. Over
time, in the absence of contradictory breakthrough news, these outlets feed such vot-
ers with what they believe in, leading them to become more extreme. Proposition 5.(a)
and (b) states that the beliefs of these voters become more polarized over time. Conse-
quently, our model generates self-reinforcing beliefs—sometimes called an “echo-chamber”
effect—that persist until strong contradictory evidence arrives.
The evolution of beliefs is quite different for the voters with moderate beliefs. The
figure shows that they consume opposite-biased outlets. Absent breakthrough news this
leads to an “anti-echo chamber” effect. Over time, the anti-echo chamber effect makes vot-
ers more undecided. Ultimately, they multi-home both left-wing and right-wing outlets,
and in the limit, learn the true state, as stated in Proposition 5.(c).32
In summary, our dynamic model of media choice predicts two different dynamics of be-
lief evolution resulting from optimal media choice: the beliefs of those who are sufficiently
extreme become more polarized, and the beliefs of those who are sufficiently moderate
converge toward the middle and result in the multi-homing of opposite media outlets.
The “anti-echo chamber” effect is a novel prediction of our dynamic model and has no
analogue in previous literature.
32Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) present evidence that a significant number of consumers multi-home
news channels with different slants. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first theoretical model to
predict the multi-homing of news outlets with conflicting slants.
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6 Extensions
In this section, we provide a foundation for our model and link it to a model of filtering
bias; and discuss several interesting extensions that correspond to various realistic features
of information acquisition. The extensions suggest that our characterization of the optimal
policy as well as the proof techniques are surprisingly robust. While the discussion is kept
deliberately informal and intuitive, more detailed arguments can be found in Appendix
C in the Supplemental Material.
6.1 Discrete-Time Foundation for Conclusive Poisson Model
Although we have only considered conclusive Poisson experiments, we show here that
these experiments are justified as optimal within a more general class of experiments.
Consider a discrete time analogue of our model with an arbitrary period length dt ∈
(0, 1/λ). The DM’s problem is the same as before, except that she incurs a cost of cdt
and discounts by the factor of e−ρdt for each period of information acquisition. In each
period, the DM may choose an experiment of the form described in Table 6.1.
state/signal L-signal R-signal
L a 1− a
R 1− b b
constraints: a, b ∈ [0, 1], 1 ≤ a+ b ≤ 1 + λdt
Table 6.1: General binary-signal experiment
The total probability a+ b of “informative” signals is bounded above by 1 +λdt. Note
that the overall informativeness of the experiment, measured by λdt, is proportional to the
length of a period, and vanishes as dt→ 0. This captures the idea that real information
takes time to arrive. In the limit as dt → 0, λ parameterizes the constraint for “flow”
information.
General binary-signal experiments in discrete time encompass rich and flexible infor-
mation structures. Setting (a, b) = (1, λdt) or (a, b) = (λdt, 1), we obtain the experiments
in Table 2.1 that converge to our conclusive Poisson information structure as dt → 0.
More generally, if we set a = γdt and 1− b = (γ−λ)dt, for γ > λ, we obtain an inconclu-
sive Poisson experiment in which breakthrough news arrives in both states but at a higher
rate in state L than in state R. In this way, any posterior belief φ < p can be obtained
from breakthrough news in the limit as dt→ 0, and a similar construction yields jumps to
φ > p. If we pick a posterior closer to the prior, breakthrough news arrives with a higher
rate. This captures the intuitive idea that a less informative signal can be obtained more
easily.33 Further, a “mixing” of Poisson processes can be attained by switching across
33To see this, fix any posterior φ below the prior p. Consider the experiment with a = p(1−φ)p−φ λdt and
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different experiments within the class. For example, dividing attention with α = 1/2 in
the baseline model, is obtained by switching between (a, b) = (1, λdt) and (a, b) = (λdt, 1)
over time.34
In summary, this class encompasses a range of both conclusive and inconclusive ex-
periments.35 Suppose the DM is free to choose from this rich class of experiments. Which
experiments are optimal? Will she necessarily choose an accurate signal? The answer
is not obvious, since the DM may find inaccurate signals appealing as they are easier to
obtain. Nevertheless, we show that conclusive experiments are optimal, thus justifying
our focus on them within this class of experiments.
Proposition 6. Consider the discrete-time problem with arbitrary period length dt ∈
(0, 1/λ) and finite or infinite number of periods. In each period and for each belief, any
binary experiment with a+ b ≤ 1 + λdt is weakly dominated by either σR or σL.
Importantly, this proposition does not claim a Blackwell dominance relation. We show
that at each history, one of the experiments σR or σL is optimal, but which one depends
on the current belief and the continuation payoffs. This result follows from the convexity
of the DM’s continuation payoff in her beliefs, which holds because the payoff of any fixed
strategy is linear in the prior belief.36
Filtering Interpretation. The class of experiments featured in Table 6.1 can be moti-
vated via a “filtering” model commonly adopted in the media choice literature. According
to this model, media “bias” or “slant” arises when an outlet filters rich raw information
into coarse “messages” for the consumers (see Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Stone (2015) and
Prat and Stro¨mberg (2013)). Suppose that an outlet observes a signal s ∈ R where s is
drawn uniformly from [0, 1] in state L and uniformly from [λdt, 1 + λdt] in state R. The
outlet must “filter” the signal into coarse messages. This could reflect, for instance, lim-
ited publishing space or broadcasting time, or a limited capacity of consumers to process
rich information. Suppose, the outlet sends binary messages to the consumer as depicted
b = 1− (1−p)φp−φ λdt. In the limit as dt→ 0, the experiment converges to a Poisson process which sends an
L-breakthrough signal at rate p(1−φ)p−φ λ in state L, and at rate
(1−p)φ
p−φ λ in state R, so that upon receiving
that signal the belief becomes exactly φ. The arrival rate increases and converges to ∞ as φ↗ p.
34As usual, in the absence of news, the belief drifts in the direction implied by Bayes rule. One example
of this is the stationary policy α(p) = 1/2, in which no updating occurs in the absence of breakthrough
news; this is obtained when two Poisson processes with jumps to zero and one are mixed equally.
35In discrete time, the class of experiments also admits a random walk, e.g. if a = b = (1 + λdt)/2.
However, this process becomes uninformative in the limit as dt → 0. It converges to a diffusion process
with identical drift in both states. In other words, an informative DDM cannot be obtained as a limit of
the current class.
36Zhong (2017) demonstrates the optimality of a (non-conclusive) Poisson experiment when the DM
incurs posterior separable cost that depends on the experiments as well as the current belief. While
similar in spirit, our result is not an implication of his result. We adopt a class of feasible Blackwell
experiments that is independent of the DM’s belief. Our constraint a + b < 1 + λdt cannot be derived
from a constraint on a posterior separable information cost function (details are available from the authors
on request). Further, we prove optimality of conclusive experiments, which is not shown in his paper.
22
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0 1 + λdt
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sˆ = λdt
(a) choice of bias (b) right-wing outlet
Figure 6.1: Filtering Bias
in Figure 6.1. It sends an L-message if s < sˆ, and an R-message if s > sˆ, for a threshold
sˆ chosen by the media outlet. The threshold sˆ characterizes the outlet’s “ideological”
orientation; the lower sˆ, the more R-biased it is. Each filtering-threshold sˆ induces an ex-
periment of the form described in Table 6.1 on page 21, with a = sˆ and b = 1+λdt−sˆ. The
“left-wing” and “right-wing” outlets in Section 5 correspond to cutoffs sˆ = 1 and sˆ = λdt,
respectively. Compared with these outlets, the outlets choosing cutoffs sˆ ∈ (λdt, 1) can
be interpreted as more moderate. In Section 5, our results hold unchanged if we expand
the set of media outlets to contain all these moderate outlets since Proposition 6 shows
that, even facing such a rich choice, consumers will still choose from two extreme media
outlets.
6.2 Non-Exclusivity of Attention
Our model does not allow for accidental discovery of evidence; i.e., a DM never receives
evidence that she is not looking for. It is plausible, however, that an individual who looks
for R-evidence may accidentally find the opposite and become convinced that the state
is L. For example, a prosecutor seeking evidence that a suspect is guilty, may stumble
upon evidence to the contrary.
This possibility can be easily accommodated within our model by assuming that the
DM is limited to an interior attention choice α ∈ [α, α], where 0 < α < 1/2 < α < 1.
Consequently she will always be exposed to evidence of both types, and may find one type
of evidence while looking only for the other. If we set α = 1 − α, Theorem 1 as well as
Propositions 2, 3, and 4 remain qualitatively unchanged. Of course, the precise cutoffs that
characterize the optimal policy change: The experimentation region shrinks and c becomes
smaller as α decreases. The intuition is that a restriction on the feasible information
choices reduces the value of information acquisition. More interestingly, opposite-biased
learning is part of the optimal policy for a larger range of cost parameters—the cutoff c
increases as α falls. Opposite-biased learning is less affected by the restriction since it
calls the DM to ultimately divide attention once p∗ is reached. Hence, at p∗ the constraint
on α is not binding, so that the value of opposite-biased learning is less sensitive to the
restriction on the feasible choices for α than the value of own-biased learning.
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6.3 Asymmetric Returns to Attention
We have also assumed that both states are equally easy to prove. The arrival rate for
breakthrough news for each type of evidence is the same. We can easily relax this feature
by introducing two different arrival rates, λ
R
for R-evidence and λ
L
for L-evidence. For a
given attention choice (α, β), this means that in state R evidence arrives at rate αλ
R
, and
in state L evidence arrives at rate βλ
L
. To fix ideas, suppose λ
R
> λ
L
so that state R is
easier to prove. If λ
R−λL is small, our characterization of the optimal policy in Theorem
1 carries over to this case: For low levels of the cost c, the optimal policy combines own-
biased and opposite-biased learning, and for moderate costs only own-biased learning is
optimal. If λ
R − λL is large, the structure changes as illustrated in Figure 6.2.
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(a) c = .15 (moderate cost) (b) c = .07 (low cost)
Figure 6.2: Value Function and Optimal Policy with asymmetric returns to attention.
Note: λ
R
= 1, λ
L
= .6, ρ = 0, uRr = u
L
` = 1, u
R
r = 1, u
L
` = .9, u
R
` = u
L
r = −.9
In the case of moderate costs (Panel (a)), the DM never looks for L-evidence, meaning
R-biased learning is not part of the optimal policy. In the case of low costs (Panel (b)), the
opposite-biased learning strategy appears, but it is skewed toward L-biased learning (or
R-evidence seeking), and the absorbing state p∗ is less than 1/2 even when the payoffs are
symmetric. As in Panel (a), for high beliefs near the stopping region, R-biased learning
is not optimal, in contrast to the characterization in Theorem 1.
6.4 Diminishing Returns to Attention
In our model, the DM never splits her attention or multi-homes media outlets, except at
the absorbing belief p∗. This feature is a consequence of the “linear” attention technology
assumed in our model. The arrival rate of an R-breakthrough is λα and the arrival rate
of an L-breakthrough is λ(1− α). This means that the marginal return to attention to a
single news source is constant. In practice, however, a diminishing marginal return may
be realistic in some contexts; namely, one may learn more efficiently from diverse news
sources than from just one. For instance, one may obtain more information by reading
the front pages of multiple newspapers, than by reading a single newspaper from front to
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back. In the Internet era, multi-homing is facilitated by news aggregators such as Google
News or Yahoo News that curate diverse news sources or perspectives that complement
one another. One can learn more efficiently from such aggregators than by focusing on a
single news source.
Diminishing marginal returns to attention can be incorporated in our model by assum-
ing that the arrival rate of R-evidence is given by λg(α), and the arrival rate of L-evidence
is given by λg(1− α), where g is an increasing function that satisfies g(0) = 0, g(1) = 1.
Our baseline model corresponds to g(x) = x and diminishing returns obtain if g(x) is
strictly concave. Panel (a) of Figure 6.3 depicts these two cases.
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(a) constant vs. diminishing returns (b) optimal media consumption
Figure 6.3: Diminishing returns to attention.
Note: λ = 1, c = .4, ρ = 0, uL` = u
R
r = 1, u
L
r = u
R
` = 0, g(x) =
√
1 + 4x− x2 − 1.
When attention has diminishing marginal returns, multi-homing, or interior choices
of α, become optimal for a wide range of beliefs as depicted in panel (b) of Figure 6.3.
Nevertheless, the basic structure of optimal policy resembles that of Theorem 1, if we
call the attention choice L-biased if α > 1/2, so that absent breakthrough news the belief
drifts toward L, and call the attention choice R-biased if α < 1/2. Specifically, the optimal
policy is again characterized by own-biased and opposite-biased learning strategies. The
former is optimal for extreme beliefs and the latter may be optimal for moderate beliefs.
The resulting characterization yields richer implications for the interplay between in-
formation choice and beliefs in the context of the media choice. For voters with extreme
beliefs, the echo-chamber effect is reinforced. Not only do the beliefs evolve over time
due to a biased news diet, the media choice itself evolves. Over time absent breakthrough
news, partisan voters’ beliefs become more extreme, and this in turn leads to a more
biased new-diet. For example, a right-leaning voter consumes more and more right-biased
news by decreasing α as her belief moves more to the right over time (see Panel (b) of
Figure 6.3). A more formal result is derived for the case of symmetric payoffs in Appendix
C.4 in the Supplemental Material.
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6.5 A Deadline for Decision Making
What happens if the DM faces a firm deadline for her decision? Our media application
raises this issue since a voter must stop deliberating on the election date. While a general
analysis incorporating a deadline is beyond the scope of the current paper, our two-
period example discussed in Section 3 sheds some light both on the robustness of our
characterization as well as the effect of a deadline.
First, both modes of learning identified in Theorem 1 can arise in the first period.
In the example in Section 3, a combination of own-biased learning and opposite-biased
learning is optimal. For other parameter values in the example, own-biased learning is
optimal for all beliefs. Second, we find a clear deadline effect. In the second period, own-
biased learning is always optimal. We conjecture that this pattern will hold more generally
if one were to introduce a firm deadline in our continuous time model—namely, the
DM will shift her attention increasingly toward own-biased news sources as the deadline
approaches. This is indeed the pattern found by Stroud (2008) from her analysis of the
2004 National Annenberg Election Survey. She finds that selective exposure and partisan
consumption of media outlets intensifies as the election date approaches (see Figures 1
and 2 therein).
6.6 Non-Binary States and Actions
Our model can be easily extended to include more than two actions. Suppose there is a
third action m with payoffs uRm ∈ (uR` , uRr ) and uLm ∈ (uLr , uL` ). Then we can define a new
learning heuristic, called “m-strategy,” that takes the following form:
p=
|
0
−→−→−→−→︸ ︷︷ ︸
α=0
p
m
———————︸ ︷︷ ︸
immediate action m
pm←−←−←−←−︸ ︷︷ ︸
α=1
|
1
The two cutoffs p
m
and pm are chosen optimally. The optimal policy is a combination
of own-biased learning, opposite-biased learning, and the m-strategy. It can take various
forms. For example if c ∈ (c, c), and the value of the m-strategy is higher than the value
of opposite-biased learning, the optimal policy takes the following form:
p=
|
0
————︸ ︷︷ ︸
action `
p∗←−←−︸ ︷︷ ︸
α=1
p−→−→︸ ︷︷ ︸
α=0
p
m
————︸ ︷︷ ︸
action m
pm←−←−︸ ︷︷ ︸
α=1
p−→−→︸ ︷︷ ︸
α=0
p¯∗ ————︸ ︷︷ ︸
action r
|
1
Along these lines, a finite number of actions can be added (see Appendix C.5 in the
Supplemental Material).
Extending the model to more than two states raises several issues. First, the state-
space of the DM’s problem becomes multi-dimensional. Second, it is natural to allow
for a larger set of news sources if there are more than two states. Within our Poisson
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framework, with two states, two sources are sufficient to allow for good news and bad
news about each state. With n > 2 states, there could be n good-news sources and
n bad-news sources, greatly increasing the complexity of the DM’s attention allocation
problem. While limited progress has been made in multi-state models with only two news
sources,37 we conjecture that a characterization in a general model will not be tractable.38
6.7 Non-Conclusive Evidence
So far, we have assumed that the DM can obtain conclusive evidence—that is, a signal
that arrives only in one state. This can be relaxed by introducing “noise,” or “false
evidence.” Suppose the DM looks for ω-evidence. With noise, this is received in state ω
with a Poisson rate of λ but also in state ω′ 6= ω with a lower rate λ < λ. If λ > 0, then
an ω-signal is no longer conclusive evidence for state ω. In a previous version of this paper
(Che and Mierendorff, 2017), we analyze this extension and show that, as long as λ is
sufficiently small, the DM finds it optimal to take an action immediately after receiving a
(noisy) breakthrough signal—a property we call Single Experimentation Property (SEP).
Given SEP, our characterization applies without any qualitative changes.39 Moreover, the
main implications in terms of accuracy and delay reported in Proposition 1 continue to
hold. A DM with a more uncertain belief, who chooses opposite-biased learning, ends up
making a more accurate decision but with a greater delay than a DM with a more extreme
belief who employs own-biased learning and as a result is more prone to mistakes.
This dependence of the stochastic choice function on the DM’s prior belief was already
present in the baseline model. With noise the stochastic choice becomes richer, and new
phenomena appear. In particular, we show that, conditional on the prior belief, a decision
maker who (by chance) received a breakthrough very quickly, makes a more accurate
decision than a DM who had to wait a long time for a breakthrough. This finding is
consistent with so-called “speed-accuracy complementarity”—a phenomenon that a more
delayed decision tends to be less accurate.40 The simple intuition is that noisy evidence
is less convincing if the DM was more skeptical when receiving it. This means that if
the DM is unlucky and waits for a longer time before receiving breakthrough news, the
accuracy of her action will suffer.
37See the discussion of Nikandrova and Pancs (2018) and Mayskaya (2016) in the Introduction.
38As far as we know, even in the Wald stopping problem, tractable characterizations are not available
for more than two states (Peskir and Shiryaev, 2006).
39A general characterization is difficult to obtain if SEP does not hold. In Che and Mierendorff
(2017) we solve such a case. While our analytical method developed here continues to be useful, the
characterization is much more complex, involving multiple jumps across different learning regions.
40This finding is often documented in perceptual judgment or consumption choice experiments con-
ducted in cognitive psychology. See Ratcliff and McKoon (2008) for a survey, and Fudenberg, Strack,
and Strzalecki (2017) for a recent economic theory.
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7 Conclusion
We have studied a model in which a decision maker may allocate her limited attention to
collecting different types of evidence that support alternative actions. Assuming Poisson
arrival of evidence, we have shown that the optimal policy combines immediate action,
own-biased learning, and opposite-biased learning for different prior beliefs. We have used
this characterization to obtain rich predictions about information acquisition and choices.
We envision several avenues of extending the current work. First, our model is rela-
tively tractable (e.g., the value function and optimal policy are available in closed form).
Therefore, we hope that this framework will be useful for integrating dynamic choice of
information in applied theory models. This includes our application to media choice,
which could be extended beyond our analysis in the present paper. Dynamic information
choice might be also embedded in a model of a committee or a jury, or in a principal-agent
setup in which a principal tries to induce an agent to acquire information or a strategic
setup such as R&D competition where different firms choose from alternative innovation
approaches over time.
Second, one may relax the “lumpiness” of information to allow for more gradual infor-
mation acquisition. Our analysis about repeated experimentation in Che and Mierendorff
(2017) points to an extension in this direction, and suggests that our characterization is
robust to such a generalization. A complete analysis of this case will be useful for applica-
tions in which decision makers learn gradually, such as a researcher who makes day-to-day
decisions about the next steps in a project, as opposed to a manager who decides only
based on reports that are made once a month. We leave this for future research.
A Proof of Theorem 1
In this appendix, we describe the construction of the heuristic strategies and state the
main steps of the proof of Theorem 1. Omitted proofs can be found in Section B.1 in the
Online Appendix. For mathematical details on optimal control problems that are used
here, see Bardi and Capuzzo-Dolcetta (1997).
A.1 The DM’s problem
The DM chooses an attention strategy (αt) and a time T ∈ [0,∞] at which she will stop
acquiring information if she does not observe any signal up to time T . Her problem is
thus given by
V ∗(p0) = max
(ατ ),T
∫ T
0
e−ρtPt(p0, (ατ ))
[
λαtpt u
R
r + λβt(1− pt)uL` − c
]
dt+ e−ρTPT (p0, (ατ ))U(pT ),
(A.1)
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s.t. p˙t = −λ (αt − βt) pt (1− pt) ,
where Pt(p0, (ατ )) := p0e
−λ ∫ t0 αsds + (1 − p0)e−λ ∫ t0 βsds, and βt = 1 − αt. Given that the
problem is autonomous, the optimal αt only depends on the belief at time t, and can thus
be written as a policy α(p). A policy α(p) is admissible if, together with (A.2) it defines a
unique path pt for any prior p0 ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, the decision to stop and take an action
only depends on pt.
A.2 Two Benchmarks and a Condition for Experimentation
Two benchmark value functions prove useful for our analysis. The first is the value of the
stationary strategy :
US(p) := p
1
2
λuRr − c
ρ+ 1
2
λ
+ (1− p)
1
2
λuL` − c
ρ+ 1
2
λ
=
λ
(
puRr + (1− p)uL`
)
2ρ+ λ
− 2c
2ρ+ λ
, (A.2)
which arises when the DM chooses αt = βt = 1/2 for all t and takes an optimal action
only after receiving the conclusive breakthrough news.
The second is what we call the full-attention value:
UFA(p) := p
λ uRr − c
ρ+ λ
+ (1− p)λu
L
` − c
ρ+ λ
=
λ
(
puRr + (1− p)uL`
)
ρ+ λ
− c
ρ+ λ
, (A.3)
which arises in a “hypothetical” scenario in which the DM chooses (infeasible) attention
αt = βt = 1 for all t and again takes an optimal action only after receiving breakthrough
news. Since limited attention prevents the DM from achieving this value in our model,
UFA(p) serves only as an analytical device for proofs.
Intuitively, UFA(p) is an upper bound for a payoff the DM can obtain from experi-
mentation. Note further that UFA(·) is linear and U(·) is piecewise-linear with a kink at
pˆ. Hence, the condition41
UFA(pˆ) > U(pˆ) (EXP)
would be necessary for experimentation to be optimal. Indeed, if (EXP) does not hold,
an immediate action is optimal for all p ∈ [0, 1]:
Proposition 7. For all p ∈ [0, 1], U(p) ≤ V ∗(p) ≤ max{U(p), UFA(p)}. In particular,
if (EXP) is violated, then V ∗(p) = U(p) for all p.
A.3 The Bellman equation
In light of Proposition 7, in the sequel we only consider the case where (EXP) holds, and
construct the value function for the range of beliefs where UFA(p) > U(p). The HJB
41It is easy to check that U(p) ≥ UFA(p) for all p if (EXP) is violated.
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equation for the DM’s problem in (A.1) is the following variational inequality
max
{
−c− ρV (p) + max
α∈[0,1]
Fα(p, V (p), V
′(p)), U(p)− V (p)
}
= 0, (A.4)
where
Fα(p, V (p), V
′(p)) :=
{
αλp
(
uRr − V (p)
)
+ (1− α)λ(1− p) (uL` − V (p))
−λ (2α− 1) p(1− p)V ′(p)
}
. (A.5)
In the “experimentation region” where V (p) > U(p), the HJB equation reduces to
c+ ρV (p) = F (p, V (p), V ′(p))
(
:= max
α∈[0,1]
Fα(p, V (p), V
′(p))
)
. (A.6)
If V (p) = U(p), then T (p) = 0 is optimal and we must have c+ρV (p) ≥ F (p, V (p), V ′(p)).
In the following, we will construct a candidate value function and show that it satisfies
(A.4) for all points of differentiability. This would be sufficient if the candidate were
differentiable everywhere. Since our candidate function has kinks, we show instead that it
is a viscosity solution of (A.4), a necessary and sufficient condition for the value function
according to the verification theorem we invoke (see Proposition 9 below).
Note that Fα(·) is linear in α. Therefore, the optimal policy is a bang-bang solution
and we have α∗(p) ∈ {0, 1} except for posteriors where the derivative of the objective
vanishes. With α set respectively to 0 and 1, we can define functions, V0 and V1, satisfying
the ODEs:
c+ ρV0(p) = F0(p, V0(p), V
′
0(p)) = λ(1− p)
(
uL` − V0(p)
)
+ λp(1− p)V ′0(p), (A.7)
c+ ρV1(p) = F1(p, V1(p), V
′
1(p)) = λp
(
uRr − V1(p)
)− λp(1− p)V ′1(p). (A.8)
Solutions to these ODEs with boundary condition V (x) = W are well-defined if x ∈ (0, 1),
and denoted by V0(p;x,W ) and V1(p;x,W ), respectively.
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A.4 Own-Biased Strategy
Recall the structure of the own-biased strategy given by (4.3). We will define its value,
labeled Vown(·) to be an upper envelope of two value functions, V own(·) and V own(·), re-
spectively its left- and right-branches. To this end, we first compute the boundary beliefs,
p∗ and p∗, and then construct the two branches by solving the ODEs (A.7) and (A.8),
using boundary conditions at p∗ and p∗. The particular construction will be ultimately
justified later through our verification argument (Proposition 9).
42V0(p;x,W ) and V1(p;x,W ) are uniquely defined if x ∈ (0, 1) because (A.7) and (A.8) satisfy local
Lipschitz continuity for all p ∈ (0, 1).
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First, value matching and smooth pasting (relative the immediate action payoffs) pin
down the boundary beliefs:43
p∗ :=
uL` ρ+ c
ρ (uL` − uR` ) + (uRr − uR` )λ
, (A.9)
p∗ =
(
uL` − uLr
)
λ− uLr ρ− c
ρ (uRr − uLr ) + (uL` − uLr )λ
, (A.10)
Next, we define the value of the left branch as V own(p) = U`(p) for p ≤ p∗. For p > p∗,
we set V own(p) = V1(p; p, U`(p
∗)) which yields:
V own(p) = −
c
ρ
(1− p) + u
R
r λ− c
λ+ ρ
p+
λ
(
c+ uL` ρ
)
ρ (λ+ ρ)
(
p∗
1− p∗
) ρ
λ
(
1− p
p
) ρ
λ
(1− p). (A.11)
Similarly, the value V own(p) of the right branch equals Ur(p) for p ≥ p∗. For p < p∗, we
set V own(p) = V0(p; p
∗, Ur(p∗)) which yields:
V own(p) := − c
ρ
p+
uL` λ− c
λ+ ρ
(1− p) + λ
(
c+ uRr ρ
)
ρ (λ+ ρ)
(
1− p∗
p∗
) ρ
λ
(
p
1− p
) ρ
λ
p. (A.12)
Combining these functions, we define the value of the own-biased strategy as Vown(p) :=
max
{
V own(p), V own(p)
}
. Without further analysis, it is not clear when Vown(p) is the
value of a strategy of the form (4.3). This will be clarified in Section A.6.
A.5 Opposite-Biased Strategy
Recall the structure of the opposite-biased strategy given by (4.4). The value of this
strategy, denoted by Vopp(p), and the reference belief p
∗ are defined as follows. First, we
observe that the value must equal the stationary value US(p∗) at p∗. Given this, we invoke
value matching and smooth pasting to pin down44
p∗ :=
(
uL` ρ+ c
)
(uRr ρ+ c) + (u
L
` ρ+ c)
. (A.13)
For p ≤ p∗ we have Vopp(p) = V0(p; p∗, US(p∗)) which yields:
V opp(p) := −
c
ρ
p+
uL` λ− c
λ+ ρ
(1− p) + λ
ρ (2ρ+ λ)
λ
(
uRr ρ+ c
)
λ+ ρ
(
1− p∗
p∗
p
1− p
) ρ
λ
p. (A.14)
43We show in Section A.6 that the boundary beliefs satisfy 0 < p∗ < pˆ < p∗ < 1 if (EXP) is satisfied.
44Namely, we insert V0(p
∗) = US(p∗) and V ′0(p
∗) = US′(p∗) in (A.7). It turns out that this yields the
same value for p∗ as the one obtained by inserting V1(p∗) = US(p∗) and V ′1(p
∗) = US′(p∗) in (A.8).
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Likewise, for p ≥ p∗, we have Vopp(p) = V1(p; p∗, US(p∗)) which yields:
V opp(p) := − c
ρ
(1−p)+u
R
r λ− c
λ+ ρ
p+
λ
ρ (2ρ+ λ)
λ
(
uL` ρ+ c
)
λ+ ρ
(
p∗
1− p∗
1− p
p
) ρ
λ
(1−p). (A.15)
A.6 Solution Candidate
Again we assume (EXP) is satisfied. We define our solution candidate as the upper
envelope of Vown(p) and Vopp(p), denoted by VEnv(p) := max {Vown(p), Vopp(p)}. This
function is characterized as follows.
Proposition 8 (Structure of VEnv). (a) If (EXP) holds and Vown(p
∗) ≥ Vopp(p∗),
then there exists a unique pˇ ∈ (p∗, p∗) such that V own(pˇ) = V own(pˇ) and
VEnv(p) = Vown(p) =
V own(p), if p < pˇ,V own(p), if p ≥ pˇ.
(b) If (EXP) holds and Vown(p
∗) < Vopp(p∗), then p∗ ∈ (p∗, p∗), and there exist a
unique p ∈ (p∗, p∗) such that Vown(p) = Vopp(p), and a unique p ∈ (p∗, p∗) such
that Vown(p) = Vopp(p) and
VEnv(p) =

V own(p), if p < p,
Vopp(p), if p ∈ [p, p],
V own(p), if p > p.
To understand how we derive the structure of the solution candidate it is useful to
make several geometric observations, which are depicted for illustrative purpose in Figure
A.1. Note first that V own(p) is strictly convex on [p
∗, 1], V own(p) is strictly convex on
[0, p∗], and Vopp(p) is strictly convex on [0, 1]. This can be seen directly from (A.11)–
(A.12) and (A.14)–(A.15).45 Figure A.1 shows that these three functions coincide with
UFA(p) at the endpoints of the respective intervals above. When the endpoints are p = 0
and p = 1 this can be seen by comparing the explicit expression and (A.3). Our first
crucial Lemma shows that the value of own-biased learning coincides with UFA at the
boundary points p∗ and p∗.
Lemma 1. The boundary points p∗ and p∗ satisfy
U`(p
∗) = UFA(p∗) and Ur(p∗) = UFA(p∗). (A.16)
If (EXP) is satisfied, then 0 < p∗ < pˆ < p∗ < 1.
45For Vopp(p), its convexity on the whole interval [0, 1] follows from the convexity of the two branches
V opp(p) and V opp(p) and smooth pasting at p
∗.
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(a) only own-biased (c = .3) (b) opposite-biased and own-biased (c = .13)
Figure A.1: Branches of the value function and solution candidate.
Note: Dashed lines indicated segments of the branches that are not part of VEnv. (Parameters: λ = 1,
ρ = 0, uRr = 1, u
L
` = .8, u
R
` = −1, uLr = −.8)
Equipped with these preliminary observations, we can turn to the characterization of
the upper envelope in Proposition 8. The following crucial “crossing lemma” characterizes
how a function solving (A.7) (such as V own or V opp) intersects a function that solves (A.8)
(such as V own or V opp).
Lemma 2 (Crossing Lemma). Let V0 satisfy (A.7) and V1 satisfy (A.8). If V0(p) =
V1(p) > (=)U
S(p) at some at p ∈ (0, 1), then V ′0(p) > (=)V ′1(p).
The Lemma implies that V own must cross V own (and likewise V own and V opp must cross
V opp and V own respectively from above), when an intersection occurs above the stationary
value function.
Suppose first that max{V own(p), V own(p)} ≥ US(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1]. Our preliminary
observations imply that V own and V own must cross each other at some p ∈ (p∗, p∗).46
Since their upper envelope exceeds US(p), the Crossing Lemma 2 implies that V own(p)
intersects V own(p) from above. Consequently the intersection point pˇ must be unique,
as depicted in Panel (a) of Figure A.1. This summarizes the crucial step for part (a) of
Proposition 8.47
Suppose next that max{V own(p∗), V own(p∗)} < US(p∗), as in Part (b) of Proposition
8, a case depicted in Panel (b) of Figure A.1. Consider the interval (p∗, p∗). From
Lemma 1 and our preliminary observations, we have Vopp(p
∗) < UFA(p∗) = V own(p
∗).
Since Vopp(p
∗) > V own(p
∗), there must be an intersection between Vopp(p) and V own(p) at
some p ∈ (p∗, p∗). Since Vopp(p) = V opp(p) > US(p) for all p < p∗, the Crossing Lemma 2
46Since V own is strictly convex and equal to the linear function U
FA(p) for p ∈ {p∗, 1}, we have
V own(p
∗) < UFA(p∗) = V own(p∗). Similarly, we obtain V own(p∗) < V own(p
∗). Hence there must be an
intersection.
47See the complete proof in Appendix B.1 for the remaining steps: (i) max{V own(p∗), V own(p∗)} ≥
US(p∗) implies the stronger condition max{V own(p), V own(p)} ≥ US(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1] that we used
here, and (ii) Vopp(p) ≤ Vown(p) for all p ∈ (0, 1) if max{V own(p∗), V own(p∗)} ≥ US(p∗).
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implies that V own(p) intersects Vopp(p) from above and hence there is a unique intersection
p ∈ (p∗, p∗). The characterization of the upper envelope for p < p∗ is completed by noting
that V own(p) < Vopp(p) for all p < p
∗.48 A symmetric argument is used to characterize
VEnv(p) for p > p
∗.
A.7 Verification of the Candidate
We now show that VEnv is the value function of the DM’s problem in (A.1).
Proposition 9. V ∗(p) = VEnv(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1]. Up to tie-breaking at pˇ, p, p, p∗, and
p∗, the optimal policy is unique.
For p /∈ (p∗, p∗), VEnv(p) = U(p) which is equal to V ∗(p) by Proposition 7. To show
optimality for beliefs inside the experimentation region, the following Lemma is crucial.
Lemma 3 (Unimprovability). (a) If V0 satisfies (A.7) and V0(p) ≥ US(p) for some
p ∈ [0, 1], then V0 satisfies (A.6) at p, and α = 0 is a maximizer.
(b) If V1 satisfies (A.8) and V1(p) ≥ US(p) for some p ∈ [0, 1], then V1 satisfies (A.6)
at p, and α = 1 is a maximizer.
The maximizers are unique if V0(p), V1(p) > U
S(p).
As we have argued in the previous section, Vopp(p) ≥ US(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1], which
implies VEnv(p) ≥ US(p). Remember that VEnv(p) is constructed of functions that satisfy
(A.7) or (A.8), respectively. Therefore, Lemma 3 shows that VEnv(p) satisfies the HJB
equation for all points where it is differentiable. We have thus verified optimality for
all p where VEnv(p) is differentiable. For verification at points where VEnv(p) is not
differentiable, we show that it is a viscosity solution of the HJB equation (see the proof
of Proposition 9 in Appendix B in the Supplemental Material).
A.8 Proof of Theorem 1
We show that Theorem 1 holds with the cutoffs:
c := 0 ∨ λ
(
uRr − uR`
) (
uL` − uLr
)− ρ (uRr uL` − uR` uLr )
(uRr − uR` ) + (uL` − uLr )
, (A.17)
c := 0 ∨
c ∧min
{
(ρ+λ)(uRr −uR` )
1+( 2ρ+λλ )
λ/ρ − ρuRr ,
(ρ+λ)(uL` −uLr )
1+( 2ρ+λλ )
λ/ρ − ρuL`
}
if ρ > 0,
c ∧ λ
1+e2
min
{(
uRr − uR`
)
,
(
uL` − uLr
)}
if ρ = 0,
(A.18)
where x ∨ y = max {x, y} and x ∧ y = min {x, y}.
48This follows from the fact that V own(p
∗) < V opp(p∗) = V opp(p
∗). Since both V own and V opp satisfy
(A.7), the former stays below the latter for all p < p∗.
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Proof of Theorem 1. Straightforward algebra shows that (EXP) is equivalent to
c
((
uRr − uR`
)
+
(
uL` − uLr
))
+ ρ
(
uRr u
L
` − uR` uLr
)
< λ
(
uRr − uR`
) (
uL` − uLr
)
.
By Propositions 7, immediate action is optimal for all p ∈ [0, 1], if (EXP) is violated,
which holds if and only if c ≥ c, where c is given by (A.17). This proves part (a).
Conversely, if c ≤ c, then (EXP) is satisfied, and by Propositions 8 and 9 experimen-
tation is optimal for some beliefs. We show that
c ≥ c ⇐⇒ max{V own(p∗), V own(p∗)} ≥ US(p∗). (A.19)
By Propositions 8 and 9, and the Unimprovability Lemma 3, this implies that the policies
stated in Parts (b) and (c) of Theorem 1 are optimal.
We first assume ρ > 0. The closed-form solutions for V own(p
∗) and V own(p∗) in (A.11)
and (A.12) can be used to show that
max
{
V own(p
∗), V own(p∗)
} ≥ US(p∗)
⇐⇒
(
max
{
c+ ρuRr
λuRr − (ρ+ λ)uR` − c
,
c+ ρuL`
λuL` − (ρ+ λ)uLr − c
}) ρ
λ
≥ λ
2ρ+ λ
⇐⇒ c ≥ c.
This proves (A.19) for ρ > 0. Taking the limit r → 0 yields the result for r = 0.49
By definition we have c ≥ c ≥ 0. It remains to show that the inequalities are strict
for ρ sufficiently small. For ρ = 0, c > 0 and
c = λmin
{(
uRr − uR`
)
,
(
uL` − uLr
)} max{(uRr − uR` ) , (uL` − uLr )}
(uRr − uR` ) + (uL` − uLr )
> λmin
{(
uRr − uR`
)
,
(
uL` − uLr
)} 1
2
> c.
Since both cutoffs are continuous in ρ, c > c > 0 for ρ in a neighborhood of zero.
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Supplemental Material (for online publication)
B Remaining Proofs from Section 4
B.1 Omitted Proofs from Appendix A.
B.1.1 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Since the DM can stop immediately, we have V ∗(p) ≥ U(p). For the second
inequality, consider the problem of a decision maker who can choose αt ∈ [0, 1] and
βt ∈ [0, 1] without the constraint that αt+βt = 1. Clearly the value of this problem exceeds
V ∗(p) for all p. The value function of the unconstrained problem is max
{
U(p), UFA(p)
}
.
To see this, it is optimal to choose αt = βt = 1. Given this policy, the belief does not
change over time if no breakthrough occurs. The optimal policy is therefore either to
stop immediately or to wait without deadline until a breakthrough occurs. Hence the
value of the unconstrained problem is max
{
U(p), UFA(p)
}
. Therefore V ∗(p) = U(p) =
max
{
U(p), UFA(p)
}
if (EXP) is violated.
B.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Suppose V0(p) = V1(p) = V (p) for some p ∈ (0, 1). Solving (A.7) and (A.8) for
V ′0(p) and V
′
1(p) and some algebra yields
V ′0(p)− V ′1(p) =
λ+ 2ρ
λp(1− p)
(
V (p)− US(p)) .
Therefore sgn(V ′0(p)− V ′1(p)) = sgn
(
V (p)− US(p)).
B.1.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Consider first the case that V0(p) satisfies (A.7). With V = V0(p), and substituting
V ′ = V ′0(p) from (A.7), we have
∂Fα(p, V0(p), V
′
0(p))
∂α
=
2ρ+ λ
λ
(
US(p)− V0(p)
)
.
This implies that α = 0 is a maximizer if V0(p) ≥ US(p), and the unique maximizer if
the inequality is strict. This proves Part (a). The proof of Part (b) follows from a similar
argument.
B.1.4 Proof of Proposition 8
The following three lemmas establish properties of the function US, V FA, Vown and Vopp
that are used in the proof of Proposition 8. Some of these properties were already estab-
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lished in Appendix A and are repeated here for convenience.
Lemma 4 (Properties of US(p) and UFA(p)). (a) US(p) < UFA(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1].
(b) US(p) and UFA(p) are linear in p.
If US(p) ≥ U(p) for some p ∈ [0, 1], then U ′`(p) < US′(p) < U ′r(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1].
If UFA(p) ≥ U(p) for some p ∈ [0, 1], then U ′`(p) < UFA′(p) < U ′r(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1].
(c) US(p), UFA(p) < U(p) at p ∈ {0, 1}; and for all p ∈ [0, 1], US(p) and UFA(p) are
strictly decreasing without bound in c.
Proof. (a) US(p) < UFA(p) is immediate from the expressions in (A.2) and (A.3).
(b) Linearity is obvious. Suppose US(p) ≥ U(p) for some p ∈ [0, 1]. To show U ′`(p) <
US′(p) for all p, suppose by contradiction that US′(p) ≤ U ′`(p) for some p. Note that
US(0) =
uL` λ−2c
λ+2ρ
< uL` = U`(0). Hence, U
S′(p) ≤ U ′`(p) and the linearity of these functions
imply US(p) < U`(p) ≤ U(p) for all p, which is a contradiction. The other inequalities
are proven similarly.
Part (c) is obtained from straightforward algebra.
The following lemma summarizes the properties of the own-biased strategy:
Lemma 5. (a) V own(p) and V own(p) are continuously differentiable and convex on (0, 1);
(b) V own(p) is strictly convex and V own(p) > U`(p) on (p
∗, 1], and V own(p) is strictly
convex and V own(p) > Ur(p) on [0, p
∗). Vown(p) > U(p) for p ∈ (p∗, p∗).
(c) If p∗, p∗ ∈ (0, 1), they satisfy
U`(p
∗) = UFA(p∗), and Ur(p∗) = UFA(p∗). (B.1)
(d) Suppose (EXP) holds. Then, 0 < p∗ < p∗ < 1, V own(p) < U
FA(p) for p ∈ (p∗, 1),
V own(p) < U
FA(p) for p ∈ (0, p∗), and Vown(p) = U(p) > UFA(p) for p 6∈ [p∗, p∗].
(e) If (EXP) is violated, then Vown(p) = U(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Parts (a)-(c) follow from straightforward algebra. For part (d), note that (EXP)
together with part (c) and Lemma 4.(b) imply 0 < p∗ < pˆ < p∗ < 1 and UFA(p) < U(p)
for p /∈ [p∗, p∗]. This implies Vown(p) = U(p) > UFA(p) for p 6∈ [p∗, p∗]. To show that
V own(p) < U
FA(p) for p ∈ (p∗, 1), note that V own(p∗) = U`(p∗) = UFA(p∗) from part (c),
and V own(1) = U
FA(1) from (A.11). Since UFA(p) is linear by Lemma 4 and V own(p)
is strictly convex (p∗, 1] by part (b), this implies implies that V own(p) < U
FA(p) for
p ∈ (p∗, 1). V own(p) < UFA(p) for p ∈ (0, p∗) is proven similarly.
Part (e) holds because by part (c), p∗ > p∗ if (EXP) is violated.
We next observe several properties of Vopp(p).
Lemma 6. (a) Vopp(p) is continuously differentiable and strictly convex on (0, 1), and
Vopp(p) ≥ US(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1] with strict inequality for p 6= p∗.
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(b) Then, Vopp(p) ≤ UFA(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1], with equality if and only if p ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. Part (a) follows from straightforward algebra. For part (b), again by straight-
forward algebra we get UFA(0) = V opp(0) = Vopp(0) and U
FA(1) = V opp(0) = Vopp(1).
Since UFA(p) is linear and Vopp is strictly convex, this implies Vopp(p) < U
FA(p) for all
p ∈ [0, 1].
We are now ready to prove Proposition 8. For the reader’s convenience, we restate the
proposition.
Proposition (Structure of VEnv). (a) If (EXP) holds and Vown(p
∗) ≥ Vopp(p∗), then
there exists a unique pˇ ∈ (p∗, p∗) such that V own(pˇ) = V own(pˇ) and
VEnv(p) = Vown(p) =
V own(p), if p < pˇ,V own(p), if p ≥ pˇ.
(b) If (EXP) holds and Vown(p
∗) < Vopp(p∗), then p∗ ∈ (p∗, p∗), and there exist a
unique p ∈ (p∗, p∗) such that Vown(p) = Vopp(p), and a unique p ∈ (p∗, p∗) such
that Vown(p) = Vopp(p) and
VEnv(p) =

V own(p), if p < p,
Vopp(p), if p ∈ [p, p],
V own(p), if p > p.
Proof. Part (a): We first prove that Vown(p) ≥ Vopp(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1]. Since Vown(p) ≥
UFA(p) > Vopp(p) for p 6∈ [p∗, p∗], it suffices to show Vown(p) ≥ Vopp(p) for p ∈ [p∗, p∗].
To this end, suppose first p∗ > p∗ and consider p ∈ [p∗, p∗] so that Vopp(p) = V opp(p).
Recall from Lemmas 5 and 6 that V own(p
∗) = UFA(p∗) > Vopp(p∗). Since Vopp(·) ≥ US(·),
by the Crossing Lemma 2, V own can cross Vopp = V opp(p) only from above on [p
∗, p∗).
If V own(p
∗) ≥ V opp(p)(p∗), by the Crossing Lemma 2, V opp(p) < V own(p) ≤ Vown(p) for
all p ∈ [p∗, p∗]. If V own(p∗) < V opp(p∗), then V own(p∗) = Vown(p∗) ≥ V opp(p∗). Since
both V own(p) and V opp(p
∗) satisfy (A.7), we must have V opp(p) ≤ V own(p) ≤ Vown(p)
for all p ∈ [p∗, p∗]. Either way, we have proven that Vopp(p) = V opp(p) ≤ Vown(p) for all
p ∈ [p∗, p∗]. A symmetric argument proves that Vopp(p) ≤ Vown(p) for all p ∈ [p∗, p∗] in
case p∗ < p∗.
We have now proven that Vown(p) ≥ Vopp(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1]. Recall from Lemma
5 that V own(p
∗) = UFA(p∗) > V own(p∗) and V own(p∗) = UFA(p∗) > V own(p
∗). By the
intermediate value theorem, there exists pˇ ∈ (p∗, p∗) where V own(pˇ) = V own(pˇ). For any p
we have Vown(p) ≥ Vopp(p) and Vopp(p) ≥ US(p) and hence Vown(pˇ) ≥ US(pˇ). The Crossing
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Lemma 2 then implies that V own cannot cross V own from below at pˇ.
50 This means that
the intersection point pˇ is unique and the structure stated in part (a) obtains.
Part (b): We first prove that p∗ ∈ (p∗, p∗). By Lemma 5, Vown(p) ≥ U(p) for all
p ∈ [0, 1]. This implies Vopp(p∗) > U(p∗), and since Vopp(p∗) = US(p∗) < UFA(p∗), and
since by Lemma 5.(d) UFA(p) ≤ U(p) for p /∈ (p∗, p∗), we must have p∗ ∈ (p∗, p∗).
Next, by Lemma 6.(b), Vopp(p
∗) < UFA(p∗) = V own(p
∗). Therefore, Vopp(p) and V own(p)
intersect at some p ∈ (p∗, p∗) and by the Crossing Lemma 2, the intersection is unique
since Vopp(p) > U
S(p) for p ∈ (p∗, p∗) by Lemma 6.(a). Moreover, for p < p∗, we have
Vopp(p) > V own(p) since both satisfy (A.7), and hence V own(p) < V own(p) for all p ∈(
p∗, p
)
. This proves the result for p ≤ p∗. For p > p∗ the arguments are symmetric.
B.1.5 Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. If (EXP) is violated, VEnv(p) = U(p) since p
∗ > p∗ by Proposition 7. Moreover
Proposition 7 shows that V ∗(p) = U(p) = VEnv(p) in this case. Similarly, if (EXP)
is satisfied, by Lemma 1 and Proposition 8, VEnv(p) = U(p) for all p /∈ (p∗, p∗) and
Proposition 7 shows that V ∗(p) = U(p) = VEnv(p) for p /∈ (p∗, p∗).
It remains to verify V ∗(p) = VEnv(p) for p ∈ (p∗, p∗) when EXP is satisfied. In the
remainder of this proof we write V (p) = VEnv(p). Theorem III.4.11 in Bardi and Capuzzo-
Dolcetta (1997) characterizes the value function of a dynamic programming problem with
an optimal stopping decision as in (A.1) as the (unique) viscosity solution of the HJB
equation.51 For all p ∈ (0, 1) where V (p) is differentiable, this requires that V (p) satisfy
(A.4).
Consider points of differentiability p ∈ (p∗, p∗). From (A.11) and (A.12), we obtain
that V own and V own are strictly convex on (p
∗, p∗). Smooth pasting at p∗ and p∗, respec-
tively, implies that V own(p) > U`(p) and V own(p) > Ur(p), and therefore Vown(p) > U(p)
for p ∈ (p∗, p∗). This implies that (A.4) is equivalent to (A.6) for all p ∈ (p∗, p∗). Since
V (p) satisfies (A.7) or (A.8) at points of differentiability, and V (p) ≥ Vopp(p) ≥ US(p), the
Unimprovability Lemma 3 implies that V (p) satisfies (A.6). Since Vopp is strictly convex
(see the discussion after Lemma 2), Vopp(p) > U
S(p), and hence Lemma 3 implies that
the optimal policy is unique at all points where V (p) is differentiable except p∗. At p∗,
the HJB equation is satisfied for any α ∈ [0, 1] but α = 1/2 is the only maximizer that
defines an admissible policy.
We have shown that V (p) satisfies (A.4) for all points of differentiability. For V (p) to
50V own and V own could be equal to U
S at pˇ which means that two branches are tangent. However, the
convexity of both branches and the fact that Vown(p) ≥ US(p) for all p, means that V own cannot cross
V own from below at any point of intersection. Therefore pˇ is unique.
51To formally apply their theorem, we have to use Pt as a second state-variable and define a value
function v(p, P ) = PV (p). Since v is continuously differentiable in P , it is straightforward to apply the
result directly to V (p).
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be a viscosity solution it remains to show that for all points of non-differentiability,
max {−c− ρV (p) + F (p, V (p), ρ), U(p)− V (p)} ≤ 0, (B.2)
for all ρ ∈ [V ′−(p), V ′+(p)]; and the opposite inequality holds for all ρ ∈ [V ′+(p), V ′−(p)],
where V ′−(p) denotes the left derivative at p, and V
′
+(p) denotes the right derivative at p.
By Proposition 8, non-differentiability at pˇ if (EXP) holds and Vown(p
∗) ≥ Vopp(p∗); and
at p and p if (EXP) holds and Vown(p
∗) < Vopp(p∗). Since V (p) ≥ US(p), the Crossing
Lemma 2 implies that V (p) has convex kinks at all these points so that V ′−(p) ≤ V ′+(p).
Therefore it suffices to check (B.2) for all ρ ∈ [V ′−(p), V ′+(p)]. Fα is linear in α (see (A.5)),
so it suffices to consider α ∈ {0, 1}. For α = 1 we have F1(p, V (p), ρ) ≤ F1(p, V (p), V ′−(p))
and for α = 0 we have F0(p, V (p), ρ) ≤ F0(p, V (p), V ′+(p)). Therefore if U(p) ≤ V (p),
which holds for our candidate solution by construction,
c+ ρV (p) ≥ max{F1(p, V (p), V ′−(p)), F0(p, V (p), V ′+(p))} (B.3)
implies that (B.2) holds for all for ρ ∈ [V ′−(p), V ′+(p)]. We distinguish two cases.
Case A: (EXP) is satisfied and Vown(p
∗) ≥ Vopp(p∗). Consider p = pˇ. (B.3) becomes
c+ ρV own(pˇ) = c+ ρV own(pˇ) ≥ max
{
F1(pˇ, V own(pˇ), V
′
own(pˇ)), F0(pˇ, V own(pˇ), V
′
own(pˇ))
}
.
By the Unimprovability Lemma 3, this holds with equality since V own(p) satisfies (A.8)
and V own(p) satisfies (A.7) at pˇ. As we have argued earlier, Vown(p) > U(p) for all
p ∈ (p∗, p∗) and hence V (pˇ) > U(pˇ). (B.2) is thus satisfied at pˇ.
Case B: (EXP) is satisfied and Vown(p
∗) < Vopp(p∗). The proof is similar to Case B.
We have thus shown that V (p) is a viscosity solution of (A.4) which is sufficient for
V (p) to be the value function of problem (A.1).
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. (a) Denote the expected delay until the DM takes an action by τ(p). At p∗ the
DM uses α = 1/2. Hence the arrival rate of a signal is λ/2 and the expected delay is
given by the expectation of the exponential distribution:
τ(p∗) =
2
λ
.
For p0 ∈ (p∗, p), the expected delay must satisfy a recursive equation with respect to any
t:
τ(p0) =
∫ t
0
s(p0λe
−λs)ds+ (p0e−λt)(τ(pt) + t).
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Differentiating both sides by t yields
0 =(p0e
−λt)(τ ′(pt)p˙t + 1)− (λpe−λt)τ(pt),
which, upon setting t = 0, reduces to:
τ ′(p) =
1− (λp)τ(p)
p(1− p)λ .
Solving this differential equation with boundary condition τ(p∗) = 2
λ
and some algebra
yields τ ′′(p) < 0. Moreover the right derivative of τ at p∗ is given by
τ ′(p∗+) =
1− 2p∗
p∗(1− p∗)λ.
Using similar steps for p0 ∈ (p, p∗) we have τ ′(pt) = λ(1−p)τ(pt)−1p(1−p)λ and τ ′′(p) < 0. The
left derivative of τ at p∗ is given by τ ′(p∗−) = τ
′(p∗+). Since τ is concave on
(
p, p∗
)
and on
(p∗, p) and τ ′(p∗−) = τ
′(p∗+), we conclude that τ is concave on
(
p, p
)
.
To show that τ is quasi-concave, it remains to show that τ is decreasing on [p, p∗]
and increasing on
[
p∗, p
]
. Since the argument is essentially the same for both cases, we
consider [p, p∗]. The expected delay implied by the own-biased strategy is
τ(p) =
∫ T ∗(p)
0
s((1− p)λe−λs)ds+ (1− p)e−λT ∗(p)T ∗(p).
where T
∗
(p) is the time it takes for the belief to reach p∗ in the absence of a signal if the
DM follows the own-biased strategy (i.e., seeks L-signals). Since T
∗
(p) is decreasing in p
we have
τ ′(p) = (1− p)e−λT ∗T ∗′(p) < 0.
Therefore it remains to show that τ(p−) ≥ τ(p+).
Suppose r = 0. If at p, the DM follows the own-biased strategy, she enjoys the payoff
of [
puRr + (1− p)uL`
]− p [uRr − uR` ]− c∫ T ∗(p)
0
(1−H(t)))dt. (B.4)
where H is the distribution of the time at which the DM makes a decision.
Suppose instead that the DM follows the opposite-biased strategy. In this case her
expected payoff (for r = 0) is given by
[
puRr + (1− p)uL`
]− c ∫ ∞
0
(1−G(t)))dt. (B.5)
where G is the distribution of time at which the DM makes a decision.
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Since at p, the DM is indifferent between both strategies we must have
∫ T ∗(p)
0
(1−H(t)))dt <
∫ ∞
0
(1−G(t)))dt,
i.e., the DM will take a longer time for decision if she chooses a opposite-biased strategy
instead. This proves part (a) of the Proposition for r = 0 if c < c. By continuity the
result extends to r in a neighborhood of zero. For the case that c ∈ [c, c), it suffices to
invoke the argument used for (p, p∗) for the whole interval (pˇ, p∗).
(b) Consider p > pˇ so that the DM uses α = 0 according to the opposite-biased
strategy. Inserting this in (2.1) and integrating we get
pt =
etλp0
1 + (etλ − 1) p0 .
Setting pT ∗ = p
∗ and solving for T
∗
we get
T
∗
=
1
λ
log
(
p∗
p∗ − p∗
1− p0
p0
)
.
The probability of a mistake is therefore
(1− p)
(
1− e−λT ∗
)
=
(1− p∗) (p∗ − p0)
p∗(1− p0) .
Differentiating this with respect to p0, we get
− p
∗ − p0
p∗(1− p0) < 0.
This proves that the probability of a mistake decreases in the distance to p∗ for high p.
For low p the argument is symmetric.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. (a) By (B.1), p∗ and p∗ are given by the intersections of U(p) and UFA(p). Since
U(p) is independent of r and c, and UFA(p) is strictly decreasing in both parameters, the
experimentation region expands as r or c fall. As (r, c)→ (0, 0), we have UFA(p)→ U(p)
for p ∈ {0, 1}, hence the experimentation region converges to (0, 1).
(b) The dependence of p∗ and p∗ on uR` and u
L
r is straightforward from the expressions
for the cutoffs in (A.9) and (A.10). (c) By (B.1), p∗ is the intersection between U`(p)
and UFA(p). The former is independent of uRr and the latter is increasing in u
R
r . Hence
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∂p∗/∂uRr < 0. Also by (B.1), p
∗ is the intersection between Ur(p) and UFA(p). We have
∂Ur(p)
∂uRr
= p >
λ
r + λ
p =
∂UFA(p)
∂uRr
.
This implies that ∂p∗/∂uRr < 0. The comparative statics with respect to u
L
` is derived
similarly.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. (a) We prove ∂pˇ/∂uR` > 0; the other case follows from a symmetric argument.
Consider V own(p). Since the right branch of the own-biased value function is obtained from
a strategy that takes action ` only if a signal has been received, its value is independent
of uR` , as can be seen from (A.12). On the other hand we have ∂V own(p)/∂u
R
` > 0 from
(A.11). Therefore the point of intersection of V own and V own is increasing in u
R
` .
(b) It is clear from (A.18) that c is decreasing in uR` and u
L
r . Therefore, it suffices to
consider the case that c < c. We prove that p → 0 monotonically as uR` → −∞. If a
opposite-biased region exists, p ∈ (p∗, p∗) is defined as the unique intersection between
V opp(p) and V own(p). Note that V opp(p) is independent of u
R
` since the opposite-biased
strategy never leads to a mistake. As in (d) we have ∂V own(p)/∂u
R
` > 0. Moreover,
Lemma 2 shows that V own(p) crosses V opp(p) from above at p. Since Vopp is independent
of uR` this implies that of p is monotonically increasing in u
R
` .
Since p is bounded from below, there exists q = limuR` →−∞ p < p
∗. Suppose by
contradiction that q > 0. Notice that, for each p ∈ [q, p∗], as uR` → −∞.
V own(p)→
λuRr pr − λc(1− p)− cr
(r + λ) r
=: V ◦own(p),
where we used the fact that p∗/(1− p∗)→ 0 as uR` → −∞.
Note that the convergence is uniform on [q, p∗] since q > 0.52 Simple algebra yields
V ◦own(p
∗) ≤ US(p∗),
and V ◦′own(p) > U
S′(p).
Since V ◦own(p) is linear in p, this implies that V opp(q) ≥ US(q) > V ◦own(q) which is a
contradiction and we must have q = 0. The proof for p is essentially the same.
52Recall from (A.11) that V own(p)→∞ as p→ 0, hence the condition q > 0 is necessary here.
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B.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. (a) We have
∂c
∂r
= − u
R
r u
L
` − uR` uLr
(uRr + u
L
` )− (uR` + uLr )
,
and hence sgn (∂c/∂r) = sgn
(
uR` u
L
r − uRr uL`
)
. It is straightforward to verify that U(pˆ) > 0
if and only if uRr u
L
` − uR` uLr > 0.
(b) Denoting Z(ρ) := (ρ+ 1)/
(
1 + (2ρ+ 1)
1
ρ
)
, we have
∂c
∂r
=
Z ′(r/λ)
(
uRr − uR`
)− ruRr if (λZ(r/λ)− r) (uRr − uL` )− λZ(r/λ) (uR` − uLr ) < 0,
Z ′(r/λ)
(
uL` − uLr
)− ruL` if (λZ(r/λ)− r) (uRr − uL` )− λZ(r/λ) (uR` − uLr ) > 0.
Consider the first case. Since Z ′(ρ) ∈
[
(1 + 3e2) / (1 + e2)
2
, 1/2
]
,
Z ′(r/λ)
(
uRr − uR`
)− uRr < 12 (uRr − uR` )− uRr = −12 (uRr + uR` ) ,
which is negative if uRr >
∣∣uR` ∣∣. Conversely, if uR` is sufficiently negative Z ′(r/λ) (uRr − uR` )−
uRr > 0. The argument for the second case is similar.
B.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Let Ft(p) be the distribution function of beliefs in the whole population at time
t. Denote the density, whenever it exists by ft(p). Denote by δt(p) = Ft(p) − F−t (p) the
mass at p if there is a mass point. For t = 0 we have the uniform distribution F0(p) = p.
(a) For part (a) we consider the subpopulation of voters with prior beliefs in Pown =
[p∗, p] ∪ [p, p∗]. Initially, these voters consume own-biased news. If we consider the same
subpopulation at later points t > 0, then their beliefs either remain inside Pown, voters
who have received an L-breakthrough, however, have a belief pt = 0. Therefore, for t > 0
we consider the subpopulation of voters with beliefs in P0own = Pown ∪ {0}. Within P0own
we consider the median belief for voters with pt > 1/2, denoted m
r
t and the median belief
for voters with pt < 1/2, denoted by m
`
t.
We first consider mrt which is given by
mrt = F
−1
t
(
Ft(p) +
Ft(p
∗)− Ft(p)
2
)
We show that this is increasing in t whenever mrt < p
∗. All individuals in P0own ∪ (1/2, 1]
consume R-biased news. This leads to two possible changes in their beliefs that effects
the median. First, for voters who receive breakthrough news the belief becomes 0 so
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that they leave the set P0own ∪ (1/2, 1]. Note that conditional on the state being L all
individuals who acquire information recieve L-breakthroughs at rate λ. If mrt < p
∗,
all voters in P0own ∪ (1/2, 1] below the median still acquire information but some voters
above the median have already stoped. Therefore, more voters below the median recieve
breakthrough than above the median. This increases the median.
Second absent a breakthrough the belief of a voter in P0own ∪ (1/2, 1] drifts upwards.
The upward drift also increses the median. Hence, if mrt < p
∗, mrt is increasing over time.
If mrt = p
∗, it remains constant for all t′ > t.
Next consider the subpopulation of individuals with beliefs in P0own ∪ [0, 1/2). This
subpopulation is composed of (i) the voters who initially consume own-biased news and
have a prior p0 < 1/2, and (ii) voters who initially consume own-biased news and have a
prior of p > 1/2, but received breakthrough news at some time t′ ≤ t. The median belief
at time t of individuals with beliefs below 1/2 in this subset is given by
m`r =
p∗, if Ft(0) ≥ Ft(p)− Ft(p∗)F−1t (Ft(p)− δt(0)+Ft(p)−F−t (p∗)2 ) , otherwise.
m`t is moved by two forces. First, individuals with p > 1/2 who receive breakthroughs
enter the population with p < 1/2, and since they have a belief p = 0 after the break-
through this reduces the median. Second, indivduals with beliefs p < 1/2 who consume
own-biased news never receive breakthroughs if the true state is L. Therefore their beliefs
drift downwards which further decreases m`t.
In summary we have shown that mrt −m`t is increasing which concludes the proof of
part (a).
Part (b) follows from similar arguments since all voters who consume any news choose
own-biased news by assumption. Therefore their beleif dynamics as as in case (a). The
reminaing voters do not consume any news so that their beliefs remain constant and leave
the median in the subpopulations above and below 1/2 unaffected.
The proof of part (c) is immediate from the definition of the opposite-biased strategy.
C Extensions
C.1 Discrete Time Foundation
Proof of Proposition 6. If the DM chooses an experiment with parameters a and b =
1 + λdt − a, then the posteriors are qR := p (λdt+ 1− a) / (pλdt+ (1− a)) when the
R-signal is received, and qL := p (a− λdt) / (a− pλdt) when an L-signal is received.
The unconditional probabilities of the signals are Prob [R-signal] = pλdt + (1 − a), and
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Prob [L-signal] = a− pλdt. Hence the DM maximizes
max
a∈[λdt,1]
(pλdt+ (1− a)) V˜ (qR) + (a− pλdt) V˜ (qL) (C.1)
where V˜ (q) = max
{
U(q), e−ρdtV (q)− c} and V (p) is the optimal value function. We
note that V (p) is weakly convex.53 Therefore the continuation value V˜ (p) is also weakly
convex.
In the following, we fix an arbitrary weakly convex continuation value V˜ and belief
p ∈ (0, 1). We show that (C.1) is maximized by α = λdt or α = 1. To do this, we rewrite
the objective in (C.1) for an arbitrary choice aˆ ∈ [λdt, 1] in a way that can be bounded
by the value for α = λdt or α = 1.
So we fix any aˆ ∈ [λdt, 1] and denote the implied posteriors by qˆR and qˆL. To rewrite
the objective in (C.1), we construct alternative payoff parameters uˆωx so that the resulting
stopping payoffs satisfy Û`(qˆ
L) = V˜ (qˆL) and Û ′`(qˆ
L) = V˜ ′(qˆL), as well as Ûρ(qˆR) = V˜ (qˆR)
and Û ′r(qˆ
R) = V˜ ′(qˆR).54 Theses conditions yields:
uˆRr := V˜ (qˆ
R) + (1− qˆR)V˜ ′(qˆR), uˆR` := V˜ (qˆR)− qˆRV˜ ′(qˆR),
uˆLr := V˜ (qˆ
L) + (1− qˆL)V˜ ′(qˆL), uˆR` := V˜ (qˆL)− qˆLV˜ ′(qˆL).
By definition, Û(p) is tangent to V˜ (p) at p = qˆL and at p = qˆR, and is everywhere
weakly below V˜ (p), given the convexity of V˜ (p).
The objective in (C.1) for aˆ can be rearranged and bounded as follows:
(pλdt+ (1− aˆ)) V˜ (qˆR) + (aˆ− pλdt) V˜ (qˆL)
= (pλdt+ (1− aˆ)) Û(qˆR) + (aˆ− pλdt) Û(qˆL)
=p(1 + λdt− aˆ)uˆRr + (1− p)(1− aˆ)uˆLr + p(a− λdt)uˆR` + (1− p)aˆuˆL`
≤ max
a∈{λdt,1}
p(1 + λdt− a)uˆRr + (1− p)(1− a)uˆLr + p(a− λdt)uˆR` + (1− p)auˆL`
= (pλdt+ (1− aˆ∗)) Û(qˆR∗) + (aˆ∗ − pλdt) Û(qˆL∗)
≤ (pλdt+ (1− aˆ∗)) V˜ (qˆR∗) + (aˆ∗ − pλdt) V˜ (qˆL∗).
In the second line, we have replaced V˜ by Û . Writing this out in the third line, we see that
the expression is linear in a. Therefore, maximizing over a ∈ {λdt, 1}, we get a weakly
higher value. In the fifth line aˆ∗ denotes a maximizer from the forth line and qˆω∗ denotes
the corresponding posterior beliefs. The last inequality follows from the fact that V˜ is
53To see this, note that the expected value of a fixed strategy (i.e. a mapping that specifies the attention
choice and action for each history) is linear in the prior belief. The value function is therefore the upper
envelope of a family of linear functions, which implies convexity.
54We use the notation Û`(p) := puˆ
R
` + (1 − p)uˆR` , Ûr(p) := puˆRr + (1 − p)uˆRr , and Û(p) :=
max{Û`(p), Ûr(p)}.
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weakly above Û . This shows that the optimal a can be found in {λdt, 1}.
C.2 Non-Exclusivity of Attention
The proofs of our main results only require minor modifications. One important change
is that the full attention strategy has to be defined using α = β = α. Without this
modification, Lemmas 1 and 4–6 are no longer valid. We also have to replace V0 and V1
by solutions to c + ρV (p) = Fα(p, V (p), V
′(p)) for α = α and α = α, respectively. The
value of the stationary strategy US(p) is unchanged as discussed in the main text. The
crucial Lemmas 2 and 3 continue to hold without modification.
Explicit expressions for the boundaries of the experimentation region and the absorb-
ing point p∗ are now given by
p∗ =
uL` ρ+ c
ρ (uL` − uR` ) + (uRr − uR` )λα
,
p∗ =
(
uL` − uLr
)
λα− uLr ρ− c
ρ (uRr − uLr ) + (uL` − uLr )λα
,
p∗ =
(
uL` ρ+ c
)
(uRr ρ+ c) + (u
L
` ρ+ c)
.
One can see from the first two expressions that p∗ increases and p∗ decreases if we decrease
the upper bound α. This confirms the claim that the experimentation region shrinks if
the constraint on α is tightened.
The cutoffs c, c are given by:
c := 0 ∨ λα
(
uRr − uR`
) (
uL` − uLr
)− ρ (uRr uL` − uR` uLr )
(uRr − uR` ) + (uL` − uLr )
, (C.2)
c := 0 ∨

c ∧ λ
1+e2
min
{(
uRr − uR`
)
,
(
uL` − uLr
)}
if ρ = 1− α = 0,
c ∧min
 (ρ+λα)(uRr −uR` )
1+( 2ρ+λ(2α−1)λ)
2α−1
(1−α)+ ρ
λ
− ρuRr ,
(ρ+λα)(uL` −uLr )
1+( 2ρ+λ(2α−1)λ)
2α−1
(1−α)+ ρ
λ
− ρuL`
 otherwise.
(C.3)
From the first expression it is immediately clear that c decreases if we reduce the upper
bound α. It is less obvious that c increases at the same time. To see this, remember from
the proof of Theorem 1 that c > c is equivalent to
max
{
V own(p
∗), V own(p∗)
}
> US(p∗).
The right-hand side of this inequality is independent of α. The left-hand however, is
decreasing in α.
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C.3 Asymmetric Returns to Attention
In this section we revisit three crucial results that are used to prove Theorem 1, and
outline how they are changed if λ
R 6= λL. Throughout we assume that λR ≥ λL. Up to
relabeling this is without loss of generality. The three crucial results are:
(a) The Crossing Lemma 2 and the Unimprovability Lemma 3. In Appendix A, we
considered solutions V0 and V1 to the HJB equation where we set α = 0 or α = 1,
respectively. If we generalize the HJB equation to allow for λ
R
> λ
L
, we can obtain
similar solutions V0 and V1. Lemma 2 also uses the value of the stationary strategy
as a benchmark. The definition of the stationary strategy has to be modified if
λ
R
> λ
L
. The Bayesian updating formula in the absence of a signal is now given
by:
p˙t = −
(
λ
R
αt − λLβt
)
pt (1− pt) , (C.4)
Hence the stationary attention strategy is given by
αS =
λ
L
λ
R
+ λ
L
.
Note that this coincides with the definition of our main model where αS = 1/2 if
λ
R
= λ
L
. The value of the stationary strategy is now
US(p) := p
αSλ
R
uRr − c
ρ+ αSλ
R
+ (1− p)β
Sλ
L
uL` − c
ρ+ βSλ
L
.
With this definition, Lemmas 2 and 3 continue to hold.
(b) Properties of the own-biased strategy in Lemma 5:55 In Appendix A we have con-
structed the own-biased strategy by first obtaining the boundary points p∗ and p∗
from value matching and smooth pasting. Following the same steps while allowing
for λ
R
> λ
L
we get
p∗ =
uL` ρ+ c
ρ (uL` − uR` ) + (uRr − uR` )λ
R
, (C.5)
p∗ =
(
uL` − uLr
)
λ
L − uLr ρ− c
ρ (uRr − uLr ) + (uL` − uLr )λ
L
. (C.6)
The branches of the own-biased solution are then given by particular solutions V0
and V1 that satisfy the boundary conditions V0(p
∗) = Ur(p∗) and V1(p∗) = U`(p∗).
Lemma 5.(a)-(b) hold unchanged if λ
R
> λ
L
. For the other results in Lemma 5, we
need to modify the definition of the full-attention strategy. We compute separately
55Lemma 5 repeats the statements of Lemma 1 so we do not discuss Lemma 1 separately.
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the value of full attention if the DM can obtain both types of evidence at rate λ
R
:
UFAR (p) : = p
λ
R
uRr − c
ρ+ λ
R
+ (1− p)λ
R
uL` − c
ρ+ λ
R
=
λ
R (
puRr + (1− p)uL`
)− c
ρ+ λ
R
,
and at rate λ
L
:
UFAL (p) : = p
λ
L
uRr − c
ρ+ λ
L
+ (1− p)λ
L
uL` − c
ρ+ λ
L
=
λ
L (
puRr + (1− p)uL`
)− c
ρ+ λ
L
.
Generalizing Lemma 5.(c) we obtain now obtain:
U`(p
∗) = UFAR (p
∗), and Ur(p∗) = UFAr (p
∗).
Lemma 5.(d) refers to the condition (EXP). If λ
R
> λ
L
, we need to define two
separate conditions
UFAR (pˆ) > U(pˆ), (EXPR)
UFAL (pˆ) > U(pˆ). (EXPL)
With this Lemma 5.(d) generalizes as follows: If (EXPR) holds, 0 < p
∗ < pˆ and
V own(p) < U
FA
R (p) for all p ∈ (p∗, 1), V own(p) > UFAR (p) for p < p∗ and V own(p) =
UFAR (p) if p ∈
{
p∗, 1
}
. If (EXPL) holds, 0 < p
∗ < p∗ < pˆ and V own(p) < UFAL (p) for
all p ∈ (0, p∗), V own(p) > UFAL (p) for p > p∗ and V own(p) = UFAL (p) if p ∈ {0, p∗}.
Lemma (5).(e) generalizes as follows: If (EXPL) is violated, then V own = U(p) for
all p ∈ [pˆ, 1]. If (EXPR) is violated, then Vown = U(p) for all p ∈ [0, pˆ].
(c) Properties of the opposite-biased solution in Lemma 6: As in the main model, we
can use smooth pasting and value matching with US to obtain p∗ as follows:
p∗ =
(
uL` ρ+ c
)
λ
L
(uRr ρ+ c)λ
R
+ (uL` ρ+ c)λ
L
. (C.7)
As before we obtain the branches of the opposite-biased strategy as particular so-
lutions V0 and V1 with the boundary condition V0(p
∗), V1(p∗) = US(p∗), and set
Vown(p) :=
V own(p), if p < p∗,V own(p), if p ≥ p∗.
With this definition Lemma 6.(a) holds unchanged. Part (b) of the Lemma has to
be modified: Vopp(p) = V opp(p) ≤ UFAL (p) for all p ∈ [0, p∗] with strict inequality for
p 6= p∗, and Vopp(p) = V own(p) ≤ UFAR (p) for all p ∈ [p∗, 1] with strict inequality for
p 6= p∗.
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The fact that the important Lemmas 2 and 3 continue to hold and we still have Vopp(p) >
US(p) for all p 6= p∗ from Lemma 6.(a), together imply that many of the structural
properties of VEnv(p) = max {Vown(p), Vopp(p)} are preserved and the structure of the
optimal policy is similar to the main model with λ
R
= λ
L
.
However, there is one crucial difference. It is now possible that V own(p) is dominated
by V own(p) or by Vopp(p) for all p < p
∗. We only consider the case that Vown(p∗) >
US(p∗). In this case we can use similar steps as in the proof of Proposition 8.(a) to show
that VEnv(p) = Vown(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1], i.e., opposite-biased learning is never optimal.
However, it is no longer guaranteed that there exists a point of intersection pˇ ∈ (p∗, p∗)
between V own(p) and V own(p). This is most easily seen by considering the generalization
of Lemma 5.(c) outlined above. It is easy to see that UFAR (p) > U
FA
L (p) for all p ∈ [0, 1]
since λ
R
> λ
L
. Since both functions are strictly decreasing in c, we can find levels of c
for which UFAL (p) < U(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1] but UFAR (p) > U(p) for some p. In this case
Vown(p) = max
{
V own(p), V own(p)
}
= max {V own(p), Ur(p)} , ∀p ∈ [0, 1]. (C.8)
More generally, (C.8) may also hold if UFAL (p) > U(p) for some p ∈ [0, 1]. Before
we could rule out this case since for λ
R
= λ
L
, V own(p) < U
FA(p) for all p ∈ (p∗, 1) and
V own(p
∗) = UFA(p∗). This is not longer true if λ
R
> λ
L
. The example in Panel (a) of
Figure 6.2 depicts such a case. Moreover we can argue that, as claimed in Section 6.3, this
case only arises if λ
R−λL is sufficiently large. To see this fix λR such that V own(p) > U(p)
for some p. Note that V own(p) is independent of λ
L
, since p∗ does not depend on λ
L
and
V own(p) is the value of seeking R-evidence. Moreover, we have V own(p
∗) > Ur(p∗) and one
can easily verify that V own(1) = U
FA
R (1) < Ur(p). Since Ur(p) is linear in p and V own(p)
can be verified to be strictly convex, there exists a unique q such that V own(q) = Ur(q).
If q ≥ p∗, the Crossing Lemma 2 implies that there exists no intersection of V own(p) and
V own(p) between p
∗ and p∗. In this case (C.8) holds. Conversely, if q < p∗ an intersection
point pˇ ∈ (p∗, p∗) exists and Vown(p) has the same structure as in our main model. It
remains to argue that q ≥ p∗ only if λR − λL is sufficiently large. For λR − λL = 0,
V own(p
∗) < UFAR (p
∗) = UFAL (p
∗) = V own(p∗) = Ur(p∗). Therefore, q < p∗. Decreasing λL
while holding λR fixed does not change q but decreases p∗. Hence, there exists a cutoff
for λL below which (for given λR), q ≥ p∗.
C.4 Diminishing Returns to Attention
As an extension to the main model in Section 2, we show that the general structure of the
solution is preserved if the arrival rate of breakthroughs from a given news source does
not increase linearly in the amount of attention allocated to the source. For the proofs we
adopt a different notation than in Section 6.4. Note that each choice of attention gives
rise to a pair of arrival rates (λR, λL). For given g(x) a pair (λR, λL) is feasible if there
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exists α ∈ [0, 1] such that λR ≤ λg(α) and λL ≤ λg(1 − α). Instead of working with the
function g(x) we introduce a function Γ(λR) that characterizes the upper bound of the
set of feasible pairs (λR, λL) as follows:56
{
(λR, λL) ∈ R+
∣∣λL ≤ Γ(λR)} .
Remember from Section 6.4 that λR = λg(α) and λL = λg(1−α). If we normalize λ = 1,
we can derive Γ(λ) from the function g(x):57
Γ(λR) = g(1− g−1(λR)).
Clearly, the DM will only chose pairs of arrival rates on the upper bound, i.e.,
(λR,Γ(λR)), so we can describe her choice by λR. To simplify the notation we omit
the superscript and write λ instead of λR. Moreover we assume that λ ∈ [0, 1]. We
maintain the following assumptions about the function Γ.
Assumption 1. Γ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is twice continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing,
strictly convex, and satisfies Γ(0) = 1, Γ(1) = 0 and Γ′(γ) = −1, where γ is the unique
fixed point of Γ.
Note that Γ′(γ) = −1 is always fulfilled if Γ is derived from a differentiable function g
since Γ(Γ(x)) = x in this case which implies that the graph of Γ is symmetric with respect
to the 45-degree line.
Example 1. A parametric example is obtained by setting g(x) =
√
1 + 4x+ x2−2. The
inverse is g−1(x) = 2
√
4− 2x− x2 and we obtain
Γ(λR) = g(1− g−1(λR)) =
√
6
√
4− 2λR − (λR)2 + λR(2 + λR)− 8− 1.
This is the example used in Figure 6.3 in Section 6.4.
56The feasible set of arrival rates can also be derived from a model with many news sources but constant
returns to attention. In this model, a news source is now characterized by two parameters (λR, λL). If an
amount of attention αi is directed to a news-source given by (λ
R
i , λ
L
i ), the DM will receive a signal from
that source that confirms state R with Poisson arrival rate λRi αi if the state is indeed R and she will receive
a signal that confirms state L with Poisson arrival rate λLi αi if the state is L. Hence, when allocating
her attention over two news sources with parameters (λRi , λ
L
i ) and (λ
R
j , λ
L
j ) with attention levels αi and
αj = 1 − αi, the DM will receive a signal that confirms R with Poisson rate λR = αiλRi + (1 − αj)λRj ,
and a signal that confirms L with Poisson rate λL = αiλ
L
i + (1− αi)λLj . The set of feasible arrival rates
(λR, λL) is thus a weakly convex subset of R+. We denote the upper bound of this set Γ(λR) and note
that weak convexity of the set implies weak concavity Γ(λR). In the main model studied before we had
Γ(λR) = 1 − λR, which is the linear boundary that is spanned by the two primitive news sources given
by (1, 0) and (0, 1).
57The normalization of the upper bound is without loss of generality since only the ratios ρ/λ and c/λ
matter.
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C.4.1 The Decision Maker’s Problem
The DM’s posterior evolves according to
p˙t = −pt(1− pt) (λt − Γ(λt)) , (C.9)
The objective is given by
J ((λt)t≥0, T ; p0) :=
{∫ T
0
e−ρtPt(p0, (λτ ))
(
ptλtu
R
r + (1− pt)Γ(λt)uL`
)
dt
+e−ρTPT (p0, (λτ ))U(pT )
}
,
where Pt(p0, (λτ )) :=p0e
− ∫ t0 λsds + (1− p0)e− ∫ t0 Γ(λs)ds.
The DM solves the problem (PΓ) given by:
V (p0) := sup
((λt)t≥0,T)
J ((λt)t≥0, T ; p0) s.t. (C.9), and λt ∈ [0, 1]. (PΓ)
We define
H(p, V (p), V ′(p), λ) :=
{
λp
(
uRr − V (p)
)
+ Γ(λ)(1− p) (uL` − V (p))
−p(1− p)(λ− Γ(λ))V ′(p)
}
.
The HJB equation for (PΓ) is
max
{
−c− ρV (p) + max
λ∈[0,1]
H(p, V (p), V ′(p), λ), U(p)− V (p)
}
= 0. (C.10)
If V (p) > U(p) this simplifies to
c+ ρV (p) = max
λ∈[0,1]
H(p, V (p), V ′(p), λ). (C.11)
The first-order condition is given by
∂H(p, V (p), V ′(p), λ)
∂λ
=
{
p
(
uRr − V (p)
)
+ Γ′(λ)(1− p) (uL` − V (p))
−p(1− p)(1− Γ′(λ))V ′(p)
}
= 0. (C.12)
For a given policy λ(p), we obtain the differential equation
c+ ρV (p) = H(p, V (p), V ′(p), λ(p)) (C.13)
⇐⇒ c+ ρV (p) =
{
λ(p)p
(
uRr − V (p)
)
+ Γ(λ(p))(1− p) (uL` − V (p))
−p(1− p)(λ(p)− Γ(λ(p)))V ′(p)
}
.
As in our original model, we will define two candidate value functions. For this purpose,
we state the HJB equation for problems in which the DM is either restricted to choose
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λ ≥ γ,
c+ ρV+(p) = maxλ∈[γ,1]H(p, V+(p), V ′+(p), λ), (C.14)
or λ ≤ γ:
c+ ρV−(p) = maxλ∈[0,γ] H(p, V−(p), V ′−(p), λ). (C.15)
we denote policies corresponding to solution to (C.14) and (C.15) by λ+(p) and λ−(p),
respectively.
C.4.2 Preliminary results
We first revisit some definitions made for the original model. The stationary strategy is
now given by choosing λ = γ until a signal arrives and then taking an optimal action
according to the signal. The value of this strategy is now given by
US(p) =
γ
ρ+ γ
U∗(p)− c
ρ+ γ
,
where
U∗(p) = puRr + (1− p)uL`
is the first best value that is achieved if the DM can learn the state without any delay.
As in the original model, we obtain a crossing condition for functions that satisfy
(C.14) and (C.15) and a condition under which solutions to (C.14) and (C.15) satisfy
(C.11).
Lemma 7 (Crossing Lemma). Suppose V+(p) is C1 at p and satisfies (C.14) and V−(p)
is C1 at p and satisfies (C.15). If V+(p) = V−(p) ≥ US(p), then V ′+(p) ≤ V ′−(p). If
V+(p) = V−(p) > US(p), then V ′+(p) < V
′
−(p).
Proof of Lemma 7. Suppose V (p) := V+(p) = V−(p) ≥ US(p) at p and denote the maxi-
mizers in (C.14) and (C.15) by λ+(p) and λ−(p) respectively.
From (C.14) and (C.15), we obtain
p(1− p)(Γ(λ−(p))− λ−(p))(λ+(p)− Γ(λ+(p)))(V ′−(p)− V ′+(p))
= (δ(p)ρ+ ∆(p))
[
V (p)−
∆(p)
δ(p)
∆(p)
δ(p)
+ ρ
U∗(p) +
1
∆(p)
δ(p)
+ ρ
c
]
≥ (δ(p)ρ+ ∆(p))
[
V (p)− γ
γ + ρ
U∗(p) +
1
γ + ρ
c
]
= (δ(p)ρ+ ∆(p))
[
V (p)− US(p)] ,
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where
δ(p) :=Γ(λ−(p))− λ−(p) + λ+(p)− Γ(λ+(p)) > 0,
∆(p) :=λ+(p)Γ(λ−(p))− λ−(p)Γ(λ+(p)) > 0,
since λ+(p) > γ > λ−(p). The inequality can be seen as follows. First, one can verify that
(∆(p)/δ(p),∆(p)/δ(p)) is the point of intersection between the forty-five degrees line and
the line segment between two points, (λ−(p),Γ(λ−(p))) and (λ+(p),Γ(λ+(p))). Since Γ is
concave, we must have ∆(p)/δ(p) < γ. Since δ(p),∆(p) ≥ 0, if V (p) ≥ US(p), the last
expression is non-negative, and if V (p) > US(p), it is strictly positive.
Lemma 8 (Unimprovability). (a) Suppose V+(p) is C1 at p and satisfies (C.14). If
V+(p) ≥ max{US(p), U(p)}, then V+(p) satisfies (C.11) at p.
(b) Suppose V−(p) is C1 at p and satisfies (C.15). If V−(p) ≥ max{US(p), U(p)}, then
V−(p) satisfies (C.11) at p.
Proof of Lemma 8. We prove the first statement; the second follows symmetrically. Sup-
pose the optimal policy satisfies λ+(p) > γ. By the condition, it is not improvable by an
immediate action or by any λ ≥ γ. Hence, it suffices to show that it is not improvable by
any λ− < γ.
Substituting V ′+(p) from (C.14) and rearranging we get
H(p, V+(p), V
′
+(p), λ+(p))−H(p, V+(p), V ′+(p), λ−)
=
δˆ(p)ρ+ ∆ˆ(p)
λ+(p))− Γ(λ+(p)))
V+(p)− ∆ˆ(p)δˆ(p)
∆ˆ(p)
δˆ(p)
+ ρ
US +
1
∆ˆ(p)
δˆ(p)
+ ρ
c

≥ δˆ(p)ρ+ ∆ˆ(p)
λ+(p))− Γ(λ+(p)))
[
V+(p)− US(p)
]
,
where
δˆ(p) := Γ(λ−)− λ− + λ+(p)− Γ(λ+(p)) and ∆ˆ(p) := λ+(p)Γ(λ−)− λ−Γ(λ+(p)).
The inequality follows from the same observation as in the proof of Lemma (7).
Before constructing the value function for (PΓ), we make one general observation
about the boundaries of the experimentation region and the value opposite-biased signals
at the boundaries.
For this purpose we consider a model in which the DM has full attention. In this case
we have λR = 1 = λL and the DM only chooses when to stop. Note that Assumption 1
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precludes the DM from choosing λR = 1 = λL so the full attention model only serves as
a hypothetical benchmark.
The value of this stopping problem is given by
V̂ (p) := max
{
U(p), UFA(p)
}
,
where
UFA(p) =
1
ρ+ 1
U∗(p)− c
ρ+ 1
.
Moreover, we note that by Assumption 1, (λ,Γ(λ)) ≤ (1, 1) for all λ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore,
V̂ (p) is an upper bound for the value function of the problem (PΓ).
Remember that in our original model, the boundaries of the experimentation region
are given by the points of intersection between UFA(p) and U(p):
UFA(p∗) = Ur(p∗). (C.16)
UFA(p∗) = U`(p∗). (C.17)
If (EXP) is satisfied, we have p∗ < p∗. We now show that the value of (PΓ) is equal to
V̂ at these boundaries. This immediately shows that p∗ and p∗ are the boundaries of the
experimentation region in (PΓ). Moreover, we show that under Assumption 1, at these
boundaries, the DM does not benefit from interior choices λ ∈ (0, 1).
Proposition 10. Suppose (EXP) is satisfied. Then p∗ and p∗ given by (C.16) and (C.17)
are the boundaries of the the experimentation region for the optimal solution to (PΓ). At
p∗ and p∗, the value of (PΓ) coincides with the value of our original model and equals
UFA(p) The loss of restricting the DM to chose λ ∈ {0, 1} vanishes as p ↓ p∗ and p ↑ p∗.
Proof. If the DM is restricted to chose λ ∈ {0, 1}, her optimal strategy coincides with the
optimal strategy in our original model. The value in our original model is a lower bound
for the value of (PΓ). Since at p∗ and p∗ the value in our original model coincides with
the upper bound UFA(p), it must also coincide with the value of (PΓ).
Note that while Assumption 1 requires Γ(λ) < 1 for λ > 0, it does not rule out an Inada
condition like limλ→0 Γ′(λ) = 0. This shows that at the boundaries of the experimentation
region, the value of a opposite-biased signal is zero even if it is cost-less to obtain. We
will see below when we characterize the value function that without an Inada condition,
there exist neighborhoods of p∗ and p∗ such that the DM does not suffer any loss if in
these neighborhoods she uses λ = 1 and λ = 0, respectively.
C.4.3 Construction of Solutions to the HJB equation
For the remainder of this section, we will focus on the cases that the payoffs are symmetric.
This simplifies the derivations and is sufficient to understand the main features of the
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optimal solution in the extension. Formally we impose:
Assumption 2. uRr = u
L
` = U
S and uR` = u
L
r = u for some u > u > 0.
In contrast to our original model, it may now be optimal to choose λ ∈ (0, 1) for beliefs
p ∈ (p∗, p∗), i.e., in the interior of the experimentation region. For an interval where this
is the case, we will obtain a differential equation for λ(p) and furthermore an equation
that expresses V (p) as a function of λ(p). We begin with the latter. To state the result
in concise form we define
A(λ) :=
Γ(λ)− Γ′(λ)λ
Γ(λ)− Γ′(λ)λ+ ρ (1− Γ′(λ)) , and B(λ) :=
1− Γ′(λ)
Γ(λ)− Γ′(λ)λ+ ρ (1− Γ′(λ)) .
A basic observation that we will use at several points is that these two functions are
(inverse) U-shaped with (maximum) minimum at λ = γ.
Lemma 9. If Assumption 1 is satisfied,
A′(λ) > (<)0 ⇐⇒ B′(λ) < (>)0 ⇐⇒ λ > (<)γ.
Proof. The Lemma follows from straightforward algebra which we omit here.
Lemma 10. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. If p ∈ (0, 1), V (p) is continuously
differentiable at p and satisfies (C.11) with maximizer λ(p) 6= γ, then
V (p) ≥ A(λ(p))u−B(λ(p)) c ≥ US(p) (C.18)
If λ satisfies (C.12) at p, then the first inequality binds. The statement continues to hold
if we replace V , λ, and (C.11), by V+, λ+ and (C.14), or V−, λ− and (C.15).
Proof of Lemma 10. We define the LHS of (C.12) as
X := (p+ (1− p)Γ′(λ)) (u− V (p))− p(1− p)(1− Γ′(λ))V ′(p). (C.19)
Eliminating V ′(p) from (C.13) and (C.19) we obtain an expression for V (p) in terms of
λ(p) and X:
V (p) = A(λ(p))u−B(λ(p)) c+ X (λ− Γ(λ(p)))
Γ(λ)− Γ′(λ)λ+ ρ (1− Γ′(λ)) .
If λ(p) is a maximizer in (C.11), we must have
X

≥ 0 if λ = 1,
= 0 if λ ∈ (0, 1),
≤ 0 if λ = 0.
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Since λ = 1 implies λ− Γ(λ(p)) > 0 and λ = 0 implies λ− Γ(λ(p)) < 0 we have
V (p) ≥ A(λ(p))u−B(λ(p)) c,
and the inequality holds with equality if X = 0 which is equivalent to λ satisfying (C.12).
This proves the first inequality and the first statement.
The second inequality follows from Lemma 9 and A(γ)u − B(γ) c = US(p), which is
obtained from straightforward algebra. It is straightforward to adapt the proofs to V+
and V−.
Using Lemma 10 we can obtain an ODE for λ that holds whenever the optimal policy
is interior, i.e., it satisfies (C.12).
Lemma 11. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. If p ∈ (0, 1), V is continuously
differentiable at p and satisfies (C.13) and the maximizer is λ(p) 6= γ and satisfies (C.12)
at p, then
λ′(p) =
[p+ (1− p)Γ′(λ(p))] [Γ(λ(p))− Γ′(λ(p))λ(p) + ρ (1− Γ′(λ(p)))]
p(1− p) (Γ(λ(p))− λ(p)) Γ′′(λ(p)) . (C.20)
The statement continues to hold if we replace V and λ, by V+ and λ+, or V− and λ−.
Proof of Lemma 11. If λ(p) 6= γ satisfies (C.12), then by Lemma 10
V (p) = A(λ(p))u−B(λ(p)) c,
and V ′(p) = A′(λ(p))λ′(p)u−B′(λ(p))λ′(p) c.
Inserting these two equations in (C.13) and solving for λ′(p) we get (C.20)
Next, we state a Lemma that identifies conditions under which the solution to (C.20)
remains bounded away from λ = 0 or λ = 1.
Lemma 12. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Then there exists function
p1(x) > 1/2 for x > γ and p0(x) < 1/2 for x < γ such that
λ(p) = λ+ > γ ⇒
{
λ′(p) < 0 ⇐⇒ p < p1(λ+)
}
,
λ(p) = λ− < γ ⇒
{
λ′(p) > 0 ⇐⇒ p > p0(λ−)
}
.
Proof. Inserting λ(p) = λ+ > γ in (C.20) yields
λ′(p) < 0
⇐⇒ [p+ (1− p)Γ′(λ+)] Γ(λ+)− Γ
′(λ+)λ+ + ρ (1− Γ′(λ+))
p(1− p) (Γ(λ(p))− λ(p)) Γ′′(λ(p)) < 0
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⇐⇒ p+ (1− p)Γ′(λ+) < 0
⇐⇒ p < p1(λ+) = |Γ
′(λ+)|
1 + |Γ′(λ+)|
Since |Γ′(λ+)| > 1 p1 > 1/2. The proof for λ(p) = λ− < γ is similar.
Next, we show the following property that relates sufficiency of the FOC (C.12) to
convexity of the value function.
Lemma 13. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied.
(a) Let W : [0, 1] → R be weakly convex and satisfy W (p) = U(p) in neighborhoods of
0 and 1. Then H(p,W (p),W ′(p), λ) is weakly concave in λ for all p and strictly
concave whenever W (p) > U(p).
(b) Let λ(p) be a solution to (C.20) such that λ(p) ∈ (0, 1) at some p. Let
pi(`) =
(ρ+ `) Γ′(`)
(ρ+ `) Γ′(`)− (ρ+ Γ(`)) .
Then
∂2 [A(λ(p))u−B(λ(p))c]
∂p2
≥ 0 if
 λ(p) > γ and p ≤ pi(λ(p)),or λ(p) < γ and p ≥ pi(λ(p)).
pi(`) > 1/2 if ` > γ, and pi(`) < 1/2 if ` < γ.
Proof. (a) Some algebra yields
∂2H(p,W (p),W ′(p), λ)
∂λ2
≤ 0 ⇐⇒ W (p)− pW ′(p) ≤ US.
The latter inequality is satisfied under the assumptions on W and both are strict if
W (p) > U(p).
(b) Differentiating A(λ(p))u − B(λ(p))c with respect to p, substituting λ′(p) from
(C.20) and differentiating again yields (after some algebra):
∂2 [A(λ(p))u−B(λ(p))c]
∂p2
< 0
⇐⇒ −(p
2 − (1− p)2Γ′(λ(p))) (ρ+ Γ(λ(p))− (ρ+ λ(p))Γ′(λ(p)))
p(1− p) (ρ+ pλ(p) + (1− p)Γ(λ(p))) Γ′′(λ(p)) > λ
′(p).
Substituting λ′(p) from (C.20) in the last line and rearranging we get
(λ(p)− Γ(λ(p))) (p [ρ+ Γ(λ(p))] + (1− p) [ρ+ λ(p)] Γ′(λ(p))) < 0.
Solving for p this yields an upper bound if λ(p) > γ so that the first term is positive and
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a lower bound if λ(p) < γ. The bound is pi(λ(p)) in both cases. If ` > γ > Γ(`) we have
pi(`) =
(ρ+ `) |Γ′(`)|
(ρ+ `) |Γ′(`)|+ (ρ+ Γ(`))
>
(ρ+ `) |Γ′(`)|
(ρ+ `) |Γ′(`)|+ (ρ+ `)
=
|Γ′(`)|
|Γ′(`)|+ 1
> 1/2.
where the last step follows because Assumption 1 implies that |Γ′(`)| > 1 if ` > γ.
Similarly we obtain pi(`) < 1/2 if ` < γ.
C.4.4 Solution Candidates
Own-Biased Learning The first candidate is obtained by assuming that the DM uses
an own-biased attention strategy. In contrast to our original model, where we choose
λ ∈ {0, 1}, we will now also use interior values for λ. In an own-biased strategy, the DM
may now receive breakthrough news for both states but with a higher likelihood in the
state that she find relatively unlikely. For instance, for low posterior beliefs p, the own-
biased strategy involves λ > γ. At the same time, the belief moves in the same direction
as the initial bias if now breakthrough arrives: p˙t < 0 if λ > γ. We have already identified
the boundaries of the experimentation region.
Lemma 14. Suppose (EXP) is satisfied. Then p∗ and p∗ satisfy
p∗ = inf
{
p ∈ [0, pˆ)
∣∣∣∣∣ c+ ρU`(p) ≤ maxλ∈[γ,1]
{
(λp+ Γ(λ)(1− p)) (u− U`(p))
−p(1− p)(λ− Γ(λ))U ′`(p)
}}
, (C.21)
p∗ = sup
{
p ∈ (pˆ, 1]
∣∣∣∣∣ c+ ρUr(p) ≤ maxλ∈[0,γ]
{
(λp+ Γ(λ)(1− p)) (u− Ur(p))
−p(1− p)(λ− Γ(λ))U ′r(p)
}}
, (C.22)
and the maximizers on the right-hand side are given by λ = 1 and λ = 0, respectively.
Moreover,
U`(p
∗) ≥ A(1)u−B(1)c,
and Ur(p
∗) ≥ A(1)u−B(1)c.
The first inequality is strict if and only if Γ′(1) is finite. The second is strict if and only
if Γ′(0) < 0.
Proof of Lemma 14. We only give the proof for p∗, the other case is symmetric. Consider
the maximization problem in (C.21). The derivative of the objective function simplifies
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to p (u− u). Therefore we can set λ = 1 and (C.21) reduces to the definition via smooth
pasting and value matching as in our original model.
The first inequality is equivalent to
1
(1 + ρ)Γ′(1)− ρ ≤ 0,
which holds under Assumption 1. The inequality is strict if and only if Γ′(1) is finite. The
second inequality is equivalent to
Γ′(0)
1 + ρ− ρΓ′(0) ≤ 0,
which is strict if and only if Γ′(0) < 0.
We are now ready to define the opposite-biased strategy. Given that we impose As-
sumption 1, we only describe the construction for the left branch which is used for p ≤ 1/2.
There are up to four intervals where the opposite-biased strategy takes a different form.
First, for p ≤ p∗, the DM takes immediate action. Then there is an interval (p∗, qb] where
the DM uses the own-biased strategy from our original model. qb is given by
∂H(qb, V own(q
b), V ′own(q
b), 1)
∂λ
= 0.
Rearranging this we get
(1 + ρ)Γ′(qb)
ρ− (1 + ρ)Γ′(qb) + q
b + (1− qb)
(
1− qb
qb
p∗
1− p∗
)ρ
= 0,
which is equivalent to
V opp(q
b) = A(1)u−B(1)c.
By Lemma 14, qb = p∗ if Γ′(1) is infinite and otherwise qb > p∗. If qb ≥ 1/2 we define
the own-biased strategy as in our original model. If qb < 1/2, Lemma 12 implies that
λ′(qb) < 0 if we impose the boundary condition λ(qb) = 1. Denote the unique solution
for p ≥ qb to (C.20) with λ(qb) = 1 by λ(p; qb, 1). Since by Lemma 12, λ′(p; p, 1) < 0 for
all p ≤ 1/2, we have λ(p; qb, 1) < 1 for p ∈ (qb, 1/2). Finally we need to take care of the
possibility that there exists qs ∈ (qb, 1/2] such that λ(p; qb, 1) = γ. If no such qs exists we
set qs = 1/2. If Assumption 2 is satisfied, a symmetric construction can be used for the
right branch with cutoffs qb = 1− qb and qs = 1− qs.
We thus define the opposite biased strategy as follows. For p /∈ (p∗, p∗): take the op-
timal immediate action. For p ∈ (p∗, p∗), experiment according to the following attention
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strategy:
λΓown(p) =

1, if p ∈ (p∗, qb],
λ(p; qb, 1), if p ∈ (qb, qs],
γ, if p ∈ (qs, qs),
λ(p; qb, 0), if p ∈ [qs, qb),
0, if p ∈ [qb, p∗),
and take an action corresponding to the signal if one is received.58 Note that by Lemma
12, λΓown(p) is strictly decreasing if p ∈ (qb, qs]∪ [qs, qb). The value of this strategy is given
by
V Γown(p) =

Vown(p), if p ≤ qb,
A
(
λ(p; qb, 1)
)
u−B (λ(p; qb, 1)) c, if p ∈ (qb, qs],
US(p), if p ∈ (qs, qs),
A
(
λ(p; qb, 0)
)
u−B (λ(p; qb, 0)) c, if p ∈ [qs, qb),
Vown(p), if p ≥ qb,
where Vown(p) denotes the value of the opposite-biased strategy from our original model.
Note that since we focus attention on the symmetric case (Assumption 2), the belief that
separates the “left branch” and the “right branch” of the opposite-biased solution is given
by pˇ. Note also, that in contrast to our original model, we defined the own-biased strategy
in a way that it is always weakly greater than US(p).
The implied dynamics of the posterior as well as the attention strategy are summarized
by the following diagram:
|——————︸ ︷︷ ︸
immediate action b
p∗
information acquisition︷ ︸︸ ︷
←−←−︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ=1
qb←−←−︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ∈(γ,1)
qs —pˇ—︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ=γ
qs−→−→︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ∈(0,γ)
qb−→−→︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ=0
p¯∗——————︸ ︷︷ ︸
immediate action a
|
Lemma 15. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Then V Γown is continuously
differentiable and convex on
[
0, qs
)
and on (qs, 1], respectively, and satisfies (C.11) on[
p∗, qs
)
and on (qs, p∗], respectively.
Proof. We show the Lemma for p ≤ 1/2. The remaining results follow from a symmetric
argument.
We need to show that V Γown is continuously differentiable at q
b. For r > 0, some algebra
yields for p ≤ 1/259
V Γown = A(1)u−B(1)c
58If qs = qs, λΓown(q
s) ∈ {λ(qs; qb, 1), λ(qs; qb, 0)} with an arbitrary tie-breaking rule.
59The derivation for r = 0 is similar.
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⇐⇒
(
p∗
1− p∗
1− p
p
)ρ
= 1− r
(1− p) (ρ− (1 + ρ)Γ′[1]) .
Substituting this expression in V Γ′own(p) yields
V Γ′own(p)
∣∣
Vown(p)=A(1)u−B(1)c =
(
c+ ρUS
)
(p+ (1− p)Γ′[1])
(1− p) p (ρ− (1 + ρ)Γ′[1])
=
∂ [A(λ(p))u−B(λ(p))c]
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ(p)=1
.
Convexity on
[
p∗, qs
]
follows from strict convexity of Vown (Lemma 5) and strict convexity
of A(λ(p))u−B(λ(p))c (Lemma 13.(b)) and continuous differentiability.
Note that by Lemma 8, it suffices to show that V Γown satisfies (C.14) for all
[
p∗, qs
)
since V Γown(p) > U
S(p) for p < qs. We have derived V Γown from the first order-condition
(C.12) and the respective Kuhn-Tucker condition of p < qb. Therefore it suffices to show
that the maximization problem in the HJB equation is concave. By Lemma 13.(a), this
is the case since we have shown that V Γown is weakly convex.
Opposite-Biased Learning The second candidate for the value function is obtained
by assuming that the DM uses an opposite-biased attention strategy. Specifically, we
define a “reference belief” p∗ such that the DM chooses λ < γ for lower beliefs p < p∗
and λ > γ for higher beliefs p > p∗. The implied dynamics of the posterior as well as the
attention strategy are summarized by the following diagram:
| −→−→−→−→︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ∈[0,γ)
p∗←−←−←−←−︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ∈(γ,1]
|
The reference belief is absorbing and we assume that once p∗ is reached, the DM
adopts the stationary attention strategy λ = γ. Under Assumption 2, we have p∗ = 1/2.
This can also be derived from value matching
V (p∗) = US(p∗)(= US), (C.23)
and the tangency condition
V ′(p∗) = US′(p∗)(= 0). (C.24)
Substituting these two conditions together with λ = γ in (C.12) yields p∗ = 1/2.60
We would now like to construct the opposite-biased strategy in a similar fashion as
the own-biased solution, that is, we will identify two types of regions. If λ ∈ {0, 1}, we
will use solutions to (A.7) or (A.8) (with λ = 1, λ = 1 and α replace by λ.) On the other
60Note that in contrast to the linear model, we cannot use the HJB equation because for λ = γ, V ′(p)
vanishes so that substituting (C.24) has no bite.
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hand, if λ ∈ (0, 1) we will use solutions to (C.20) with a suitable boundary condition. A
problem arises since we want to impose the boundary condition λ(p∗) = γ. Note that this
implies λ′(p∗) = 0/0. We therefore begin by identifying a solution to (C.20) that satisfies
λ(p∗) = γ as well as λ′(p∗) > 0.
Lemma 16. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Then there exists a unique con-
tinuously differentiable function λˆopp(p) which satisfies (C.20) for all p in a neighborhood
of p∗ = 1/2, such that λ(p∗) = γ and λ′(p∗) > 0. The derivative at p∗ is given by
λˆ′opp(p
∗) = − (ρ+ γ) +
√
(ρ+ γ)2 − 8 (ρ+ γ)
Γ′′(γ)
.
Proof of Lemma 16. The ODE (C.20) can be written as
λ′(p) =
P (p, λ(p))
Q(p, λ(p))
,
where
P (p, λ) = [Γ(λ)− Γ′(λ)λ+ ρ (1− Γ′(λ))]× [p+ Γ′(λ) (1− p)] ,
Q(p, λ) = p(1− p)Γ′′(λ) [Γ(λ)− λ] .
Since P and Q are both continuous and have continuous partial derivatives, the behavior
of solutions that go through points in a neighborhood of (p∗, γ) is, under some conditions
(see below), the same as for61
λ′(p) =
a (p− p∗) + b (λ(p)− γ)
c (p− p∗) + d (λ(p)− γ) , (C.25)
where
a = ∂pP (p
∗, γ) = 4 (ρ+ γ) > 0,
b = ∂λP (p
∗, γ) = (ρ+ γ) Γ′′(γ) < 0,
c = ∂pQ(p
∗, γ) = 0,
d = ∂λQ(p
∗, γ) = −1
2
Γ′′(γ) > 0.
The characteristic equation is
x2 − bx− ad = 0.
Since ad > 0, the characteristic equation has two reals roots of opposite sign. This implies
61See e.g. Bronshtein, Semendyayev, Musiol, and Muehlig (2007).
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that (p∗, γ) is a saddle point and there are two continuously differentiable solutions λ(p)
that pass through (p∗, γ). In the case of a saddle point, the behavior of the solutions of
(C.25) in a neighborhood of (p∗, γ) corresponds to the behavior of the solutions to (C.20).
Hence there exist two continuously differentiable solutions λ(p) that satisfy the boundary
condition λ(p∗) = γ.
Next we want to obtain λ′(p∗) for these solutions, and show that only one of them has
a positive derivative. We have
λ′(p∗) = lim
p→p∗
λ′(p) = lim
p→p∗
P (p, λ(p))
Q(p, λ(p))
= lim
p→p∗
∂pP (p, λ(p)) + ∂λP (p, λ(p))λ
′(p)
∂pQ(p, λ(p)) + ∂λQ(p, λ(p))λ′(p)
=
a+ bλ′(p∗)
dλ′(p∗)
.
Hence λ′(p∗) solves
x2 − b
d
x− a
d
= 0,
λ′(p∗) =
b
2d
±
√(
b
2d
)2
+
a
d
.
Since a/d > 0, there is one positive and one negative solution. For the opposite-biased
solution, we are interested in a solution that satisfies λ′(p∗) > 0. Hence we have
λ′(p∗) =
b
2d
+
√(
b
2d
)2
+
4 (ρ+ γ)
d
= − (ρ+ γ) +
√
(ρ+ γ)2 − 8 (ρ+ γ)
Γ′′(γ)
.
Lemma 16 provides the solution λˆopp which together with V (p) = A(λˆopp(p))u defines
Vopp in a neighborhood of p
∗. To extend this definition to (0, 1) we first extend λˆopp to
the maximal interval (q, q) where λˆopp(p) ∈ (0, 1) \ {γ} unless p = p∗.
Lemma 17. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. There exist two points 0 ≤ q <
p∗ < q ≤ 1 such that
(a) λˆopp(p) is well defined as the unique C1-solution to (C.20) that satisfies the properties
in Lemma 16
(b) λˆopp(p) > γ if p > p
∗ and λˆopp(p) < γ if p < p∗.
(c) Either q = 0 or λˆopp(q) = 0.
(d) Either q = 1 or λˆopp(q) = 1.
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Note that Properties (c) and (d) mean that the interval (q, q) is the maximal interval
where λˆopp(p) ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Lemma 17. Consider the interval (q, p∗). λˆopp(p) ∈ (0, γ) in a neighborhood of
p∗. Moreover, (C.20) satisfies local Lipschitz continuity if p ∈ (0, p∗) and λ 6= γ. Hence, if
there exists a C1 solution to (C.20) with initial condition λˆopp(p∗−ε) ∈ (0, γ) that satisfies
λˆopp(p) ∈ (0, γ) for all p ∈ (q, p∗), then it is the unique such solution. We first show that by
extending the interval from a neighborhood of p∗ to (q, p∗), we do not violate λˆopp(p) < γ.
Suppose by contradiction that there exists p′ < p∗ such that limp↘p′ λˆopp(p) ↗ γ. Note
that
p′ + Γ′(γ)(1− p′) < p∗ + Γ′(γ)(1− p∗) = 0.
Hence, since Γ′′ < 0,limp↘p′ λˆ′opp(p) → ∞ which contradicts limp↘p′ λˆopp(p) ↗ γ. There-
fore we can extend the domain of λˆopp(p) to the left until either p = 0 or λˆopp(p) = 0.
This completes the proof for p < p∗ and the argument for p > p∗ is similar.
If q > 0 and q < 1, respectively, then we further extend λopp(p) to (0, 1) by setting
λ = 0 for p < q and λ = 1 for p > q. We define
λΓopp(p) :=

0, if p ≤ q,
λˆopp(p), if p ∈ (q, q),
1, if p ≥ q.
The value of this strategy is given by
V Γopp(p) :=

V0
(
p; q, A(0)u−B(0)c) if p ≤ q,
A(λopp(p))u if p ∈ (q, q),
V1 (p; q, A(1)u−B(1)c) if p ≥ q.
Lemma 18. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Then V Γopp(p) is a C1 solution to
(C.11) and V Γopp(p) is strictly convex on
(
q, q
)
.
Proof. The proof has several steps. We give arguments for p ≥ 1/2. The Lemma then
follows by symmetry (Assumption 2) and the fact that V Γopp(p) is constructed in a way that
is continuously differentiable at p∗ (see (C.24)). Suppose in the following that p > 1/2.
First we note that V Γopp(p) is continuously differentiable. This holds by construction
for p 6= q and at q it follows by the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 15.
Second, we shows that V Γopp(p) is strictly convex. For p > 1/2, λ
Γ
opp(p) > γ . Therefore,
by Lemma 13, strict convexity on (p∗, q) follows if p < pi(λΓopp(p)) for all p ∈ (p∗, q).
Note that pi(λΓopp(p
∗)) = pi(γ) = 1/2. We show that whenever p = pi(λΓopp(p)), then
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pi′(λΓopp(p))λ
Γ′
opp(p) > 1. This implies that p < pi(λ
Γ
opp(p)) for all p ∈ (p∗, q). We have
pi′(λΓopp(p
∗))λΓ′opp(p
∗) > 1
⇐⇒ 2− (ρ+ γ)Γ
′′(γ)
4(ρ+ γ)
(√
(r + γ)2 − 8 (ρ+ γ)
Γ′′(γ)
− (ρ+ γ)
)
> 1
⇐⇒ Γ′′(γ) < 0.
for p > p∗, we substitute p = pi(λΓopp(p)) in (C.20), which yields (after some algebra)
pi′(λΓopp(p
∗))λΓ′opp(p
∗) = 1 +
Γ′(λΓopp(p))
(
ρ+ Γ(λΓopp(p))−
(
ρ+ λΓopp(p)
)
Γ′(λΓopp(p))
)(
ρ+ λΓopp(p)
) (
ρ+ Γ(λΓopp(p))
)
Γ′′(γ)
> 1.
This completes the proof of convexity on (p∗, q). For p > q, convexity has been shown in
Lemma 6. Since V Γopp(p) is continuously differentiable at p = q, V
Γ
opp(p) is strictly convex
on [0, 1].
Third, by Lemma 13.(a), convexity implies that the maximization problem in (C.14)
is concave so that the first-order condition is sufficient. Therefore, V Γopp(p) satisfies (C.14)
or for p > p∗.
Finally, convexity, together with (C.23) and (C.24) implies that V Γopp(p) ≥ US(p) for
p ≥ p∗. Lemma 8 then implies that V Γopp(p) satisfies (C.11).
Finally we show that λΓopp(p) is strictly increasing.
Lemma 19. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied and let q, q be given as in Lemma
17. Then λΓopp(p) is strictly increasing on
(
q, q
)
.
Proof. For p ∈ (q, q), V Γopp(p) = A(λopp(p))u. Differentiating with respect to p we get
V Γ′opp(p) = A
′(λopp(p))λ′opp(p)u.
Hence if λ′(p) = 0 for p 6= 1/2, we must have V Γ′opp(p) = 0. Since V Γ′opp(1/2) = 0, this violates
strict convexity of V Γopp(p). Therefore λ
′(p) 6= 0 for all p ∈ (q, q). Since λ′(1/2) > 0, this
implies that λ′(p) > 0 if p ∈ (q, q).
C.4.5 Optimal Solution
As in our original model we show that the value function V Γ is the upper envelope of
the two solution candidates. In contrast to our original model, the optimal policy is not
a bang-bang solution. We show that inside the own-biased region, α(p) = g−1(λ(p)) is
decreasing whenever it is not a corner-solution. This means that more extreme beliefs lead
to a more own-biased news-diet. In the opposite-biased region, α(p) is strictly increasing.
This implies that more moderate beliefs lead to a more balanced news-diet.
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Theorem 2. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied.
(a) If (EXP) is violated then V Γ(p) = U(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1].
(b) If (EXP) is satisfied and V Γown(p) > U
S(p) for all p 6= 1/2, then V Γ(p) = V Γown(p)
for all p ∈ [0, 1], and α(p) = g−1(λ(p)) is strictly decreasing if V Γ(p) > U(p) and
α(p) = g−1(λ(p)) ∈ (0, 1).
(c) If (EXP) is satisfied and V Γown(p) = U
S(p) for some p 6= 1/2, then V Γ(p) =
max
{
V Γown(p), V
Γ
opp(p)
}
, and α(p) = g−1(λ(p)) is strictly decreasing if V Γ(p) =
V Γown(p) > U(p) and λ(p) ∈ (0, 1), and strictly increasing if V Γ(p) = V Γopp(p).
Proof of Theorem 2. Follows from the same arguments as the proof of Theorem 1.
C.5 Multiple Actions
In this Appendix, we extend the model in Section 2 to include a third action x = m which
yields uRm and u
L
m in states R and L. Up to relabeling of the actions it is without loss to
assume that uRm ∈
(
uR` , u
R
r
)
. Further we assume uLm < u
L
` which guarantees that action m
does not dominate action ` for all beliefs.
The optimal policy will be affected by the availability of action m if it is optimal to
take this action for some beliefs. To identify when this is the case, we define a strategy
that specifies a stopping region [p
m
, pm] in which action m is taken immediately. For
p > pm, the strategy prescribes attention to the L-biased news source (α = 1) and for
p < p
m
, the strategy prescribes attention to the R-biased news source (α = 0). We call
this strategy the “m-strategy.” It has the following structure:
p=
|
0
−→−→−→−→︸ ︷︷ ︸
α=0
p
m
———————︸ ︷︷ ︸
immediate action m
pm←−←−←−←−︸ ︷︷ ︸
α=1
|
1
If this strategy is part of the optimal solution (for some range of belief), the bound-
ary points p
m
and pm must satisfy value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions that
resemble those used to define p∗ and p∗. We will define pm by imposing smooth pasting
and value matching with Um(p) in (A.8):
c+ ρUm(p) = λp
(
uRr − Um(p)
)− λp(1− p)U ′m(p). (C.26)
Similarly we will define p
m
by imposing smooth pasting and value matching with Um(p)
in (A.7):
c+ ρUm(p) =λ(1− p)
(
uL` − Um(p)
)
+ λp(1− p)U ′m(p). (C.27)
The following lemma identifies when solutions to (C.26) and (C.27) exist, and when
these solutions can be used to define the cutoffs p
m
and pm in a way the m-strategy only
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prescribes information acquisition if it is not dominated by immediate action m or by the
stationary strategy.
Lemma 20.
(a) Let uRm ≥ UFA(1) or c + ρuLm ≤ 0. If q1 ∈ (0, 1) is a solution to (C.26), then
V1(p; q1, Um(q1)) ≤ Um(p) for all p ∈ [q1, 1].
(b) If uRm < U
FA(1) and c + ρuLm > 0, then there exists a unique solution q1 ∈ (0, 1) to
(C.26) given by
q1 =
uLmρ+ c
ρ (uLm − uRm) + (uRr − uRm)λ
. (C.28)
and V1(p; q1, Um(q1)) is strictly convex on [q1, 1].
(c) Let uLm ≥ UFA(0) or c + ρuRm ≤ 0. If q2 ∈ (0, 1) is a solution to (C.27), then
V0(p; q2, Um(q2)) ≤ Um(p) for all p ∈ [0, q2].
(d) If uLm < U
FA(0) and c + ρuRm > 0, then there exists a unique solution q2 ∈ (0, 1) to
(C.27) given by
q2 =
(
uL` − uLm
)
λ− uLmρ− c
ρ (uRm − uLm) + (uL` − uLm)λ
(C.29)
and V0(p; q2, Um(q2)) is strictly convex on [0, q2].
(e) Suppose uRm < U
FA(1) and c + ρuLm > 0, and u
L
m < U
FA(0) and c + ρuRm > 0. If
Um(q1) ≥ US(q1) and Um(q2) ≥ US(q2), then q1 ≥ q2.
Proof. For (a) and (b) we note that the general solution to (A.8) is given by
V1(p) =
pρuRr λ− c (ρ+ (1− p)λ)
ρ(ρ+ λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:z(p)
+
(
1− p
p
) ρ
λ
(1− p)C,
there C is the constant of integration. Clearly, the sign of C determines whether the
solution is convex or concave since
d2
dp2
((
1− p
p
) ρ
λ
(1− p)
)
> 0
Moreover, we note the V1(1) = U
FA(1) regardless of the value of the constant C.
For the proof of (a) we distinguish several cases: Case 1: If uRm = U
FA(1) and c+ρuLm =
0. In this case, Um(p) = z(p) for all p. Hence any q1 ∈ (0, 1) satisfies (C.26) and smooth
pasting but V (p; q1, Um(q1)) = Um(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1].
Case 2: uRm > U
FA(1). We first show that if (C.26) and smooth pasting is sat-
isfied for p′ ∈ (0, 1), then Um(p′) < z(p). Suppose by contradiction that Um(p′) ≥
z(p′). If (C.26) is satisfies at p′, then Um(p) is tangent to V1(p; p′, Um(p′)at p′ and since
V1(p; p
′, Um(p′)) ≥ z(p), V1(p; p′, Um(p′)) is weakly convex as a function of p. But this
implies that V1(1; p
′, Um(p′)) ≥ Um(1) = uRm > UFA(1). This is a contradiction since we
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argued above that any solution to (A.8) satisfies V1(1) = U
FA(1). Hence (C.26) or smooth
pasting is vioalated at p′ if Um(p′) ≥ z(p′). If Um(p′) ≤ z(p′), (C.26), and smooth pasting
is satisfied for p′ ∈ (0, 1), then V1(p; p′, Um(p′)) is strictly concave as a function of p and
tangent to Um(p) at p
′. Hence V1(p; p′, Um(p′)) < Um(p) for all p > p′.
Case 3: uRm < U
FA(1). If c+ ρuLm ≤ 0, then Um(0) < z(0) and since z(1) = UFA(1) we
have Um(p) < z(p) for all p. As in case 2, if p
′ ∈ (0, 1) satisfies (C.26) and smooth pasting,
then V1(p; p
′, Um(p′)) < Um(p) for all p > p′ which contradicts V1(1; p′, Um(p′)) = UFA(1).
Hence there is no solution to (C.26) that satisdies smooth pasting. This concludes the
proof of (a).
For (b), note that if uRm < U
FA(1) and c + ρuLm > 0, then Um(p) crosses z(p) from
above. As in case 3 in the proof for part (a), z(p′) > Um(p) implies that (C.26) and
smooth pasting cannot be both satisfied. Next we identify a solution q1 to (C.26) for which
V ′(q1; q1, Um(q1)) = U ′m(q1). If Um(q1) = z(q1) then V
′(q1; q1, Um(q1)) = z′(q1) = U ′m(q1).
On the hand limq1→0 V
′(q1; q1, Um(q1)) = −∞. Therefore, the intermediate value theorem
implies that there exists q1 ∈ (0, 1) such that V ′(q1; q1, Um(q1)) = U ′m(q1) and simple
algebra shows that is is given by (C.28).
The proofs of (c) and (d) follow from a similar argument. For part (e) suppose by
contradiction that q1 < q2. Since both V1(p; q1, Um(q1)) and V0(p; q0, Um(q0)) are strictly
convex on [q1, q2] and coincide with Um(p) at q1 and q2, respectively, there exists p
′ ∈
(q1, q2) such that V1(p
′; q1, Um(q1)) = V0(p′; q0, Um(q0)) > Um(p′) and V ′1(p
′; q1, Um(q1)) >
V ′0(p
′; q0, Um(q0)). Since Um(p) ≥ US(p) for p ∈ q1, q2 and both Um and US are lin-
ear, we have V1(p
′; q1, Um(q1)) = V0(p′; q0, Um(q0)) > US(p′). By Lemma 2 this implies
V ′1(p
′; q1, Um(q1)) < V ′0(p
′; q0, Um(q0)) which is a contradiction. Therefore we must have
q1 ≥ q2.
Based on the results of this lemma, we define p
m
and pm as follows:
pm =
q1, if uRm < UFA(1), c+ ρuLm > 0, and Um(q1) ≥ US(q1)1, otherwise.
p
m
=
q2, if uLm < UFA(0), c+ ρuRm > 0, and Um(q2) ≥ US(q2)0, otherwise.
Consider pm. By Lemma 20.(a)-(b) u
R
m < U
FA(1) together with c + ρuLm > 0 is a
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a solution in (0, 1) to (C.26) that
satisfies smooth pasting and is not dominated by immediate action m. Hence if the
necessary and sufficient condition is violated we set pm = 1. Similarly, Lemma 20.(c)-(d)
motivates the definition of p
m
= 0 if uBm ≥ UFA(0) and c+ ρuRm ≤ 0.
The requirements that Um(q1) ≥ US(q1) in the definition of pm and Um(q2) ≥ US(q2) in
the definition of p
m
, guarantee, respectively, that the m-strategy always has the structure
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depicted in the diagram above because it avoids defining pm = q1 and pm = q2 when
q2 > q1.
The value of the m-strategy is
Vm(p) :=

V0(p; pm, Um(pm)), for p < pm,
Um(p), for p ∈
[
p
m
, pm
]
,
V1(p; pm, Um(pm)), for p > pm.
The Lemmas leading to the upper envelope characterization of the value function in
Proposition 9 depend on the properties of branches defined by particular solutions to
(A.7) and (A.8). Therefore the same steps can be applied in this extension and we obtain
that the value function of the extended problem is given by:
V (p) = max {Vown(p), Vopp(p), Vm(p)} .
It is straightforward to extend this to more than three actions. Suppose we have
actions `, r as well as additional actions m1,m2, . . ., where for all i = 1, 2, . . ., (u
R
mi
, uAmi)
satisfy the conditions formulated for action m at the beginning of this section. In this
case we define an mi-strategy for each of the actions in the same way as above. Denote
the value of strategy mi by Vmi(p). The value function of the DM’s problem is then given
by
V (p) = max {Vown(p), Vopp(p), Vm1(p), Vm2(p), . . .} .
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